74 REVIEW. [March, 



There is an index to the whole. 



The first part of the Methodology or system treats of species, 

 genera, families, etc., whether natural or artificial, and the fol- 

 lowing quotation from Linnseus is prefixed : '" Natur(S opus semper 

 est Species et Genus. Generum Genus est Ordo, Ordinum autem 

 genus Classis est.""^ Here the author shows that three very 

 eminent recent authors have adopted different views on this nice 

 question of natural systems. For example, Schlciden maintains 

 that Nature only creates individuals; Lindley, species ;t and 

 Fries, species and genera. 



There may not be in reality so great a difference between the 

 opinions of these great men as appears at first sight. The dis- 

 pute may be about words rather than things. Genera and species 

 are meaningless terms unless individuals be implied. Hence, if 

 Nature creates genera and species, she creates individuals. 



The author then goes on to show that possibly two questions 

 may be confounded, viz. the things themselves and the notions 

 which we entertain about them. But into this metaphysical 

 domain it is not safe for us to enter. Let us stick to our text, or 

 rather to our author, who says, as it appears to us : " The ques- 

 tion then which we propose, if properly circumscribed, is thus to 

 be stated : Does Nature restrict herself in the production of those 

 forms or types which v/e call organisms, which in a narrower 

 sense we call species, in a wider genera, families, etc. etc. ?" Also, 

 " If these forms exist independently of any law, we are of neces- 

 sity induced to infer that all Nature is under no law {nulla ratione 



* " Nature always produces species and genus, or these are the work of Nature ; 

 but the Order is the genus of the genera, and the Class is the genus of the orders." 



t (Lind. Nat. Syst. Bot. prsef. p. vii.) "Of this system (the Natural, so called), 

 Nature herself, who (which) creates species, knows nothing. Our genera, orders, 

 and classes and the like are mere contrivances to facilitate the arrangement of our 

 ideas with regard to species. A genus, order, or class is therefore called natural, 

 not because it exists in nature, but because it comprehends species naturally re- 

 sembluig each other more than they resemble anything else." (How can they have 

 a natural resemblance, or naturally resemble each other, if not natural? If the 

 similarity be natural, and not artificial, the genus must be as natural as the 

 species. But here is the rub. The professors make a hitch. They take it for 

 granted that species are natural. If species are natural, why not genera, orders, 

 and classes ?) 



" Eries autem rem ita dijudicat, ut species et genera velit a natura ordinata, non 

 a nobis inventa; majores autem ordines arte constare;" or, as it may be rendered, 

 " Fries, on the other hand, decides that both species and genera are natural and not 

 artificial, but that larger groups (orders) are so (artificial)," etc. etc. (p. ii.) 



