as well as data from other ships and from aircraft. Once these data are 

 analyzed, transportation experts will have a much better idea of what 

 kind of ship is required to maintain year-round operations in the Arctic. 

 Working from this baseline, factors such as capital investment, operating 

 costs, the time factor, and cost of tenninal facilities will be incorporated to 

 arrive at a shipping cost per barrel, and a decision as to whether tanker 

 transport of oil through the "northwest passage" is economically 

 competitive. 



It is, of course, far too early to label the voyage either a success or a 

 failure. Many difficulties were encountered — the Manhattan herself was 

 in difficulty in the ice several times, and had to call on icebreaker as- 

 sistance; the icebreakers themselves had problems, and the Northwind had 

 to be replaced; and the Manhattan suffered a hull rupture due to ice 

 impact. Redesign of some hull characteristics will doubtless be required, 

 and possibly further experimental voyages prior to actual decisionmaking. 

 Alternatives, such as pipelines or submarine tankers, are still being considered. 



While many of these final questions remain as yet unanswered, the 

 Manhattans voyage made a significant contribution not only to U.S. 

 competence in polar transportation, but to the Nation's knowledge of the 

 Arctic regions in general. Perhaps most importantly, it stimulated new 

 thinking about old problems, and may thereby point the way to other ad- 

 vances in the rapidly developing Arctic. 



Looking to the Future 



A strong and profitable merchant marine fleet, competitive in the world 

 market, is an integral part both of our national and international economy. 

 The administration's initiatives in this field, coupled with a vigorous response 

 from industry, and supported by an imaginative program of research and 

 development, will work toward the rapid achievement of this goal. 



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