124 THE DESCENT OF MAN. 



tendency be willing to defend, in concert with others^ his 

 fellow-men; and would be ready to aid them in any way, 

 which did not too greatly interfere with his own welfare or 

 his own strong desires. 



The social animals which stand at the bottom of the scale 

 are guided almost exclusively, and those which stand higher 

 in the scale are largely guided, by special instincts in the 

 aid which they give to the members of the same commu- 

 nity; but they are likewise in part impelled by mutual love 

 and sympathy, assisted apparently by some amount of 

 reason. Although man, as just remarked, has no special 

 instincts to tell him how to aid his fellow-men, he still has 

 the impulse, and with his improved intellectual faculties 

 would naturally be much guided in this respect by reason 

 and experience. Instinctive sympathy would also cause 

 him to value highly the approbation of his fellows; for, as 

 Mr. Bain has clearly shown,* the love of praise and the 

 strong feeling of glory, and the still stronger horror of 

 scorn and infamy, "are due to the workings of sympathy.^' 

 Consequently man would be influenced in the highest 

 degree by the wishes, approbation, and blame of his fellpw- 

 men, as expressed by their gestures and language. Thus 

 the social instincts, which must have been acquired by man 

 in a very rude state, and probably even by his early ape-like 

 progenitors, still give the impulse to some of his best 

 actions; but his actions are in a higher degree determined 

 by the expressed wishes and judgment of his fellow-men, 

 and unfortunately very often by his own strong selfish 

 desires. But as love, sympathy and self-command become 

 strengthened by habit, and as the power of reasoning 

 becomes clearer, so that man can value justly the judgments 

 of his fellows, he will feel himself impelled, apart from 

 any transitory pleasure or pain, to certain lines of conduct. 

 He might then declare not that any barbarian or unculti- 

 vated man could thus think I am the supreme judge of 

 my own conduct, and in the words of Kant, I will not in 

 my own person violate the dignity of humanity. 



The More Enduring Social Instincts Conquer the Less Per- 

 sistent Instincts. We have not, however, as yet considered 

 the main point, on which, from our present point of view, 



* " Mental and Moral Science," 1868, p. 354. 



