126 THE DESCENT OF MAN. 



As far as exalted motives are concerned, many instances 

 have been recorded of savages, destitute of any feeling of 

 general benevolence toward mankind, and not guided by 

 any religious motive, who have deliberately sacrificed their 

 lives as prisoners,* rather than betray their comrades; and 

 surely their conduct ought to be considered as moral. As 

 far as deliberation, and the victory over opposing motives 

 are concerned, animals may be seen doubting between 

 opposed instincts, in rescuing their offspring or comrades 

 from danger; yet their actions, though done for the good 

 of others, are not called moral. Moreover, anything per- 

 formed very often by us, will at last be done without 

 deliberation or hesitation, and can then hardly be distin- 

 guished from an instinct; yet surely, no one will pretend 

 that such an action ceases to be moral. On the contrary, 

 we all feel that an act cannot be considered as perfect, or 

 as performed in the most noble manner, unless it be done 

 impulsively, without deliberation or effort, in the same 

 manner as by a man in whom the requisite qualities are 

 innate. He who is forced to overcome his fear or want of 

 sympathy before he acts, deserves, however, in one way 

 higher credit than the man whose innate disposition leads 

 him to a good act without effort. As we cannot distinguish 

 between motives, we rank all actions of a certain class as 

 moral, if performed by a moral being. A nio ral being is 

 one who is capable of comparing hi s past and .Iuture actions 

 or motives, and of approving or dis^proving of them. We 

 have no reason to suppose that ai!y uX "the lower animals 

 have this capacity; therefore, when a Newfoundland dog 

 drags a child out of the water, or a monkey faces danger to 

 rescue its comrade, or takes charge of an orphan monkey, 

 we do not call its conduct moral. But in the case of man, 

 who alone can with certainty be ranked as a moral being, 

 actions of a certain class are called moral, whether per- 

 formed deliberately, after a struggle with ojiposing motives, 

 or impulsively through instinct, or from the effects of 

 slowly gained habit. 



But to return to our more immediate subject. Although 

 some instincts are more powerful than others, and thus lead 

 to corresponding actions, yet it is untenable, that in man 



* I have given one sucli case, namelv, of three Patagonian Indians 

 who preferred being shot, one after the other, to betraying the plans 

 of tb^ir companions in war (" Journal of Researches," 1845, p- 1Q3), 



