&BNERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSlOlf, 699 



ite impulse, but is much influenced by the praise or blame 

 of his fellows. The appreciation and the bestowal of 

 praise and blame both rest on sympathy; and this emotion, 

 as we have seen, is one of the most iniportant elements of 

 the social instincts. Sympathy, though gained as an in- 

 stinct, is also much strengthened by exercise or habit. As 

 all men desire their o^vn happiness, praise or blame is 

 bestowed on actions and motives according as they lead to 

 this end; and as happiness is an essential part of the gen- 

 eral good the greatest-happiness principle indirectly serves 

 as a nearly safe standard of right and wrong. As the rea- 

 soning powers advance and experience is gained the remoter 

 effects of certain lines of conduct on the character of the 

 individual and on the general good are perceived; and then 

 the self -regarding virtues come within the scope of public 

 opinion and receive praise and their opposites blame. But 

 with the less civilized nations reason often errs, and many 

 bad customs and base superstitions come within the same 

 scope and are then esteemed as high virtues and tlieir 

 breach as heavy crimes. 



The moral faculties are generally and justly esteemed as, 

 of higher value than the intellectual powers. But we 

 should bear in mind that the acti^'ity of the mind in vividly 

 recalling past impressions is one of the fundamental though 

 secondary bases of conscience. This affords the strongest 

 argument for educating and stimulating in all possible 

 ways the intellectual faculties of every human being. No 

 doubt a man with a torpid mind, if his social affections and 

 sympathies ai-e well developed, will be led to good actions, 

 and may have a fairly sensitive conscience. But whatever 

 renders the imagination more vivid and strengthens the 

 habit of recalling and comparing past impressions will make 

 the conscience more sensitive, and may even somewhat 

 compensate for weak social affections and sympathies. 



The moral nature of man has reached its present stand 

 ard partly through the advancement of his reasoning powers 

 and consequently of a just public opinion, but especially 

 from his sympathies having been rendered more tender ana 

 widely diffused through the effects of. habit, example, 

 instruction and reflection. It is not improbable that after 

 long practice virtuous tendencies may be inherited. With 

 the more civilized races the conviction of the existence of 

 an all-seeing Deity has had a potent influence on the 



