28 



should be considering a multiyear revolving fund allocation to mar- 

 keters which would provide a more stable business environment. 



Third, it is time to retarget the intermediate GSM- 103 credit 

 guarantee. GSM- 103 should be refocused as a credit guarantee 

 program directed to service economies in transition, be they states 

 of the former Soviet Union or countries in Africa, Asia, or Latin 

 America, making the very difficult conversion from state ownership 

 to private markets, and determine in this case that creditworthi- 

 ness for these countries be so determined if they are in compliance 

 with Gr-7 and IMF restructuring programs and guidelines. 



Fourth, our private-public cooperation. Our cooperator program 

 needs to be revitalized and refocused in order to leverage our re- 

 sources and maximize our penetration of markets throughout the 

 world and emerging economies. We need to maximize our presence 

 in those countries in particular, and with these newly privatized 

 businesses in those countries who will be the leaders in expanding 

 their food systems and in determining the food products that will 

 be purchased, produced, processed, distributed, and consumed. 



We then need to look further at building a team concept for co- 

 operators which would include coservicing and resource pooling, 

 creating central regional bases or staging areas for specialists and 

 smaller in-country service teams. 



Fifth, as export subsidies are first capped and then reduced 

 under the Uruguay Round, the EEP operation should be restruc- 

 tured to enhance commercial flexibility in using permitted subsidy 

 levels to maximize the permitted trade effect. 



Sixth, the market promotion program needs to be maintained, 

 but be restructured on a multiyear formula. MPP can be very im- 

 portant in particular as a market development tool in building a 

 United States presence in countries under minimum access provi- 

 sions required by the Uruguay Round agreement. Also, with many 

 of these developing countries and countries that are privatizing in 

 working with the private sector. 



Seventh, we must link our foreign trade objectives with our own 

 domestic farm programs and policies. I have long believed there 

 should be a trade impact statement required on any piece of do- 

 mestic policy legislation relating to agriculture. So often in the 

 past, without meaningfully doing it, our farm programs have un- 

 dercut, eroded or even seriously harmed our trade potential, and 

 we cannot afford for that to continue in the future, especially with 

 funding so limited. 



And eighth, implementation of the Uruguay Round's terms that 

 reduce subsidies open markets is crucial to a successful expansion 

 of agricultural trade. The United States should undertake an ag- 

 gressive proactive strategy over the next 12 to 24 months as the 

 Uruguay Round is implemented and as we deal with bilateral prob- 

 lems that occur as a result of this. We should challenge under the 

 GATT, and under the new rapid dispute settlement procedures of 

 the GATT, any country that is not properly implementing its agri- 

 cultural commitments or is attempting to circumvent the competi- 

 tive trade objective. 



In closing, Mr. Chairman, no country has a better potential than 

 the United States to be a winner in the global agricultural trading 

 system — if we commit to a long-term strategy and we direct our 



