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apparent. However, while most producers desire to cooperate with environmental compliance 

 programs to the greatest extent economically feasible, the presence of a few "bad actors" 

 necessitates the inclusion of an enforcement mechanism in the institutional scheme to spur 

 widespread compliance. A carefully planned program which links voluntary environmental 

 compliance efforts by producers, under the direction of state conservation agencies, with an 

 enforcement program for "bad actors" is termed "planned intervention." In keeping with 

 prevailing notions of cooperative federalism to address environmental problems nationally, 

 "planned intervention" is grounded on state institutional leadership with assistance by federal 

 agencies. 



"Planned intervention" is voluntary only to the extent that producers are provided a flexible 

 timeframe and a range of choices for implementing management practices and technologies to 

 control nonpoint source pollution. Recalcitrant polluters who refuse to cooperate with the state 

 conservation agency to implement necessary management measures are referred to the state 

 regulatory agency for enforcement action. However, for "planned intervention" to function 

 effectively, state conservation agencies and environmental regulatory agencies must cooperate 

 from the outset to establish essential program parameters. For example, the regulatory agency 

 must identify water quality criteria for successful pollution abatement to provide producers a 

 static target by which to gauge pollution prevention and abatement efforts. Unfortunately, 

 almost no state agencies have developed nonpoint source water quality criteria to provide such 

 a measure of success. Until those criteria are developed, interim criteria may suffice, e.g., the 

 extent of implementation of technologies or management practices by producers, physical-process 

 modeling predictions, or percent pollutant loading reductions. In addition to a pollution- 

 abatement target, regulatory agencies and state conservation districts must cooperate in 

 developing and articulating the following parameters: 1) the permissible timeframe for 

 management practice development and implementation by producers; 2) the timeframe for 

 expected water quality amelioration subsequent to implementation of management practices and 

 technologies; and 3) the criteria according to which recalcitrant polluters are referred to the 

 regulatory agency for enforcement action. 



During the 1993 legislative session, the 73rd Texas Legislature enacted Senate Bills 502 and 503 

 which provided for a "planned intervention" approach to agricultural nonpoint source pollution. 

 The new laws call for the Texas State Soil and Water Conservation Board (TSSWCB) to develop 

 water quality certification programs in watersheds significantly degraded by agricultural nonpoint 

 source pollution. In those watersheds, TSSWCB coordinates the efforts of local conservation 

 districts and federal agricultural assistance agencies to help producers in developing site-specific 

 "water quality management plans" to control nonpoint source pollution. TSSWCB, in 

 cooperation with local conservation districts, also is responsible for investigating complaints of 

 agricultural nonpoint source pollution across the state. Once an investigation is completed, 

 complainants and producers alike may request a hearing before members of the local 

 conservation district. Any party dissatisfied with the results of that hearing may appeal to 

 TSSWCB for an additional hearing. This local alternative dispute resolution process provides 

 all parties concerned an inexpensive alternative to traditional litigation. Where cases of pollution 

 are confirmed, TSSWCB and local conservation districts assist producers in developing 



lc(1008«/TIAEH:3;21/94 4 



