14 



Since 1972, there have been over half a dozen major reviews of the Depart- 

 ment of Agriculture labs. Every one of these reviews had harsh criticisms of 

 the department's research. The 1972 National Academy of Science's report 

 said: 



Much of agricultural research is outmoded, pedestrian and inefficient. 

 One of the reviewers taking part in the 1987 study said: 



It was one of the most depressing things I ever saw. We saw hundreds of mil- 

 lions wasted on people who hadn't published in 20 years. 



Why has the Agricultural Research Service remained in such a dismal 

 state? Because the funding is driven by pork barrel politics rather than sci- 

 ence. It has been said that the only time you can close a research station is 

 when a congressman dies or is defeated. Providing researchers with lifetime 

 job security, but depriving them of the opportunity for meaningful work is a 

 perfect recipe for driving out the competent people while retaining the time- 

 serving hacks. 



This experience with the Department of Agriculture is significant for the 

 future of the federal labs. Keeping them open for the sake of keeping them 

 open is to condemn them to the mediocrity of the Agricultural Research Serv- 

 ice. 



Regarding subsidies to industry, the current Office of Aeronautics and 

 Space Technology of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and 

 its predecessor, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, were es- 

 tablished as a subsidy to the aviation industry. This subsidy is still national 

 policy. Its stated goals are to "develop the technology for a fuel-efficient, af- 

 fordable subsonic aircraft, to develop "the technology for sustained supersonic 

 cruise capability," and to develop the technology for "a transatmospheric vehi- 

 cle." 



For nearly four decades, U.S. aircraft manufacturers have been the pre- 

 eminent suppliers to the world's airline. To what extent was the current NASA 

 and earlier NACA responsible for that situation.^ 



Miller and Sawyers identified six innovations which made possible what 

 they called the economic airplane, and therefore the start of the airline indus- 

 try. Only one of these six was due to the NACA, the forerunner of the present 

 NASA. The others were all developed by industry, in some cases with partial 

 military funding. 



An interdepartmental study identified 13 innovations, introduced between 

 1925 and 1940, that were important to aviation. Only three of these came 

 from NACA. All the rest came from industry. 



Total U.S. R&D spending on aeronautical research from 1925 to 1975 far 

 exceeded that of NASA and its predecessors. Military and industry spending 

 were roughly equal and amounted to about 95 percent of the total. NASA 

 spending came to about 5 percent of the total aeronautical R&D. 



This research indeed paid off. From 1925 through 1975, productivity in the 

 airline industry grew 25 times. The payback in the airline industry alone was 

 about 30 times greater than would have been obtained by investing the same 

 money in high-grade industrial bonds. 



However, since most important aeronautical innovations came from outside 

 NASA and its predecessors, since NASA and its predecessors' funding 

 amounted to only about 5 percent of the total, and since the payback from 

 that aeronautical R&D far exceeded the amount spent, it is clear that the 



