17 



a splendid job. If we really wanted to send a goodwill ambassador 

 to Russia, it would be Chairman de la Garza, because he connected 

 with those people. 



This week's Newsweek has an article by James Baker, and I 

 would commend it to you. It talks about the stakes for them and 

 us. If we do nothing, he says, "Across Russia the tendency toward 

 fragmentation and the regionalization of power would increase. 

 With Moscow paralyzed, local bosses would seize even greater con- 

 trol from the center, and the autonomous Republics would then 

 seek more autonomy, perhaps complete independence. The long- 

 term danger in this scenario is that Russia could become ungovern- 

 able and descend into greater chaos. In a country with thousands 

 of nuclear weapons, the dangers of fragmentation are obvious. Cen- 

 tralized and luiified command and control of nuclear weapons could 

 be jeopardized." 



Then he goes on and says, "The greater danger over the next 

 years, if not months, is the rise of a virulent Russian nationalism — 

 indeed, what one might call fascism that preys on the economic 

 deprivation sweeping Russia and the psychological disorientation 

 brought on by the end of the empire. These extremists would draw 

 their power not from what they stand for, but what they stand 

 against — against democracy, against capitalism, and against the 

 West." 



He succinctly puts why it's necessary for the West to take some 

 action to try to help these folks out. 



I have a fairly short statement, and I'd like to read it, if possible. 

 I thank you for the opportunity of allowing me to testify today. 



As deeply intertwined as American interests are in the reform 

 process underway in the former Soviet Union, the direction and 

 pace of the processes are, in the end, questions the Russians must 

 determine for themselves. The United States can, and should en- 

 courage that process, however. We have substantial interests in 

 seeing the process continue toward the creation of a democratic, 

 market-oriented state. Having spent trillions and devoted our natu- 

 ral energy for four decades to winning the cold war, we cannot af- 

 ford to lose the peace, nor can American farmers and agribusiness 

 afford to lose this customer. 



The credits the USDA has extended to Russia and the former So- 

 viet states are the primary forms of assistance the West has made 

 available to the conversion process. They have also been of im- 

 mense benefit in keeping open one of the single most important 

 markets American agriculture has. 



In the legislation I have proposed and want to discuss with you, 

 I propose that we use the leverage of these credits to encourage the 

 reform process in Russia and advance our interests there, and I 

 want to reinforce that point. The American people, I think, will 

 have a difficult enough time supporting increased aid, which I 

 think we should do, but I think that they would support it a lot 

 more easily if they knew that there was some leverage to get the 

 Russians to do things. I propose that leverage will be to get them 

 to not only continue democratization, but reduce their nuclear 

 weaponry, which they have agreed to do as a part of the START 

 agreement. 



