21 



But, look, the long-term economic benefits to the United States 

 are extraordinary from this in terms of open markets, in terms of 

 jobs. We have a part of the world that's never bought an5rthing in 

 their lives. Just think if each Russian would, let's say, double or 

 triple their consumption of meat. It would have a powerful effect 

 on the American livestock industry. 



So I do think that you — I mean, my belief is that foreign policy 

 is as much related to economic policy as anj^hing else, so I don't 

 think you can totally remove it. But I don't want to do away with 

 the GSM program. I think it's logistically a very convenient way to 

 get the aid in. 



Mr. Allard. I agree that our businesses, when they look at Rus- 

 sia, they look at the business opportunities, and we have tremen- 

 dous opportunities for American business if we can get the Rus- 

 sians to move toward a free market and begin to recognize some 

 of those basic things that you have to have in order for a free mar- 

 ket system, such as clear ownership of property, which we weren't 

 able to clarify with the video that we heard this morning. 



I hear you on your concern about nuclear weapons and disman- 

 tling them, but how are we going to place a value on particular 

 types of nuclear weapons? Is one type of missile going to open up 

 the market for a certain number of bushels of wheat, or is a dif- 

 ferent type of nuclear warhead going to open it up for more wheat? 

 How do we arrive at this? I don't see that as an expeditious proc- 

 ess. 



Mr. Glickman. Let me tell you, first of all, I think it's a good 

 question. Again, we provide good methods of computing compliance 

 with arms control agreements now. Let me tell you why I arrived 

 at this approach. No. 1, the most pressing problem in the world is 

 nuclear proliferation. We are on the verge of seeing dozens of coun- 

 tries have both nuclear weapons and delivery systems capable of 

 transporting them to people whom they don't like, and that's a far 

 greater danger than anything we've ever faced before. The Russian 

 Republic and the Ukrainian Republic both possess a large number 

 of nuclear weapons. 



No. 2, American people want to help the Russians, but they also 

 know we have serious problems at home, and they don't want to 

 provide extraordinary public taxpayer help here without at least 

 getting something from it. 



So I'm trying to put these two things together: Nuclear prolifera- 

 tion stability, and giving the American people some reason to be- 

 lieve they're getting a bang for their buck here, that it's not just 

 more Government assistance that will never come back. That's why 

 I tied the two things together. 



Now, let me give you a hypothetical. It could be as simple as re- 

 quiring full compliance with the START agreement that would 

 allow write-downs to take place, in which case you don't have to 

 go with this kind of weapon— an SS-18, an SS-19, an SS-20. I'm 

 not sure we want them to get into that kind of situation. It could 

 be accelerating the destruction of warheads that would get them 

 more relief. I don't know exactly what it would be, but I think 

 that's along the lines of what I'm talking about. 



