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last 12 to 15 years. Their peak year was in 1984 when they im- 

 ported close to 60 million tons. These figures are outlined in the 

 attached schedule on the written material. 



During this same period, the Soviet domestic wheat and course 

 grain production was between 180 million to 200 million tons. So 

 what we are pointing out here is that they are importing about 20 

 percent of their normal crop. It is well-known that one of the trage- 

 dies of the Soviet grain, oilseed, and potato production is that 20 

 to 25 percent of their crops in the field, ready for harvest, never 

 get to consumption. 



It is no coincidence that since 20 percent of the 200 million ton 

 field production is 40 million tons, this crop loss roughly matches 

 the 30 million to 35 million tons of Soviet grain imports over the 

 last several years. If we use a delivered price — in the trade, we call 

 this GIF: cost insurance freight — of $100 a ton delivered to the So- 

 viet Union, now the former Soviet Union, FSU, is spending $3,500 

 million to $4 billion a year to pay for these grain imports. I use the 

 word "pay" in quotations since during the last 24 months, the Rus- 

 sians and many of the other Republics of the former Soviet Union, 

 using USDA credit programs, have defaulted on their payment 

 schedules, both interest and principal. 



Commodity Credit Corporation, as well as the European Com- 

 mon Market is very worried of extending further credit. The heart 

 of the matter is not complicated. The central planning system for 

 agriculture and food, headquartered in Moscow, has, over the gen- 

 erations of the Communist era literally directed units of production 

 in the Soviet food system to go where each particular unit of the 

 system is directed to go, ordering how much tonnage or units to de- 

 liver, what each unit's quota or production would be, when to ship 

 and most importantly, at what price to sell. 



The Agriculture and Food Central Planning Bureau in Moscow, 

 at its peak, employed more than 400,000 people to direct the food 

 production and distribution system within the Soviet Union. Is it 

 any wonder, then, that so much of the grain, oilseeds, and other 

 foodstuffs produced never receive timely nor revenue meaningful 

 decisions? 



Consequently, the grain either rotted in the field or lacking stor- 

 age and transportation, laid in bags alongside of the fields and pro- 

 duced a harvest of the fattest rats in the world, combining with in- 

 sects and birds gorging on the unprotected grain and with inclem- 

 ent weather, adding the final piece of loss to the unprotected total. 



Current Russian presidential staff, Mr. Yeltsin's staff, and lead- 

 ership knows this and desperately wants to privatize Russian 

 farms to see that the profit motive prevails and that decisions will 

 be made by the cooperatives, the collectives, and the private farm- 

 ers themselves to do what must be done to protect and preserve oil- 

 seed and grain supplies. 



The solution is simple. Find a way to save 30 million tons of lost 

 grain. It then follows, no need to import 30 million tons of grain 

 and the final sequence, don't spend $3 billion. The waste and spoil- 

 age problems plaguing the FSU's, existing agricultural systems are 

 partly attributable to the use of the large grain storage facilities 

 that are not well distributed throughout the countryside and can- 

 not be relocated to reflect changing needs. 



