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STATEMENT OF CAROL L. BROOKINS, PRESIDENT, WORLD 



PERSPECTIVES, INC. 



Ms. Brookins. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for allowing 

 me to testify before your subcommittee. I'm president of World Per- 

 spectives, Inc., which is a consulting company, and we analyze po- 

 litical, economic, and trade factors that affect agricultural markets 

 and the global food system. We work with companies and with gov- 

 ernments around the world, including clients in Russia and the 

 former Soviet Union. 



I'd like to address the importance of Russia to United States ag- 

 riculture, and I think we should be very careful not to forget that 

 there has been a direct correlation between the Soviet Union's de- 

 mise as a military threat and its inability to provide an adequate 

 food supply to its population. I began my work in the commodity 

 field in 1972, when the Russians came in for the first time as a 

 major sustained buyer of our grains, and that just happened to be 

 the year that they began to pursue detente with us. The cold war 

 that we have won was not just a competition between missile silos, 

 but I believe between grain silos as well. 



Now, over the past 20 years, our agricultural trading relationship 

 has played a vital role in building confidence and mutual benefit. 

 The Soviet Union has paid us more than $30 billion in cash for 

 United States farm commodities, and I think we all know how that 

 converts into United States jobs and economic activity. Russia is a 

 major long-term commercial market for us. We don't want to dam- 

 age that relationship, and certainly we don't want to throw the 

 Russians into the arms of the European Community's farmers. 



I would note here, Mr. Chairman, that the EC already has called 

 for negotiating a free-trade agreement with Russia. This would be 

 a serious threat to the competitive interest of United States 

 agriculture. 



Well, what do we do today to provide agricultural commodities? 

 What we do will set the basis for our commercial and trade rela- 

 tionship with the new Russia and other states of the former Soviet 

 Union. I'd hke to focus briefly on the issue of appropriate responses 

 to Russia's needs and to our interests in filling those needs. 



Responding to Russia means business for the United States econ- 

 omy. We can do this in various ways, and one way isn't exclusive. 

 Commodity credits, possible barter programs, humanitarian and 

 technical assistance are all efforts that we have to consider and 

 probably implement in one way or another. Briefly, though, it's in 

 our interest to build a long-term commercial market in the new 

 Russia for our commodities, our technologies, our equipment, and 

 our food products. 



I'd like to focus briefly on the issue of commercial or concessional 

 credits. Certainly until Russia completes a Paris Club official debt 

 rescheduling, the only possible United States response to move 

 farm products short term must be concessional assistance, either 

 grants or loans. Food for progress is obviously very appropriate. 

 But once a Paris Club is done, or if a Paris Club is done, and once 

 Russia becomes current in meeting its payments to us under the 

 GSM program, we have more options to consider based on an as- 

 sessment of what makes sense in terms of Russia being a commer- 

 cial or concessional market. If Russia reschedules its debt and is 



