263 



m. A Summaiy of Possible Consequences of the Collapse of Communist Agriculture 



In the past, deficient supplies in state food stores made possible the growth of collective 

 farm or cooperative markets that provided an outlet for the products of small-plot agriculture. Any 

 fiiture shift to private fanning is Ukely to cause an inaease in the production of the types of 

 products formerly produced on the old private plots, and consequent declines in prices. If the 

 supplemental income ^om this source declines it will be more difficult for the big farms to bold 

 their labor supply. This could lead to rising labor costs, and rural depopulation. 



One prospect could be an increase in labor costs on big ianns, forcing recognition of their 

 inefficiency, and an accompanying fall in income from private plots, leading to widespread 

 abaadonment This will reveal the faa that the big farms are too big. and the small plots are too 

 small. We can expect the emergence of farm units carved out of former collective or state farms 

 that could be large enough to retain their labor supply by providing full-time employment for one 

 or several families. 



This will take time. Only a limited amount of farm equipment suited for farms of this size 

 is now being produced. A credit system serving farms of this size does not exist. Management 

 practices and work norms have been tailored to relatively large work groups or brigades, organised 

 around the principle of job specialization. Farm policy and practices in the FSU produced 

 ^>edalists, not generaiists. A major change in orientation toward farm work will be needed and 

 this seems imllkely to occur until a new generation takes conmiand. 



A second consequence of collapse has been accelerated by the depreciation of the ruble. 

 This has increased the urgency of the search for security, and is increasing the attractiveness of 

 owning a tract of land. Land appreciates in value as currencies depreciate. 



Privatizing agricultural land when the currency is collapsing will thus insure that no market 

 process of vahiing land can be used. The result seems likely to be some form of payment for land 

 based on commodities, coupled with ceilings on land holdings set in terms of hectares. A precedent 

 for this solution was set by the land reform in Taiwan after 1951, with pigment denominated in 

 bonds pegged to rice and sweet potato prices. 



IV. Land Tenure Adaptations to the Collapse of Communism 



The historical record is ftill of cases in which bound peasants, serfs, or slaves have been 

 converted into shaiecroppers. With some exceptions, this has been an almost universa] stage in 

 the evohition of land tenure systems. With the collapse of centralized power over land use 

 decisions, and the chaotic state of the debate over land ownership, it seems likely that the existing 

 coDective and state farms will be converted into organizations with functions similar to those 

 exercised by landlords under share-cropping systems. 



In the short-nm. there is scarcely any alternative. There is ix> stock of equipment suitable 

 for family sized famu. Buildings for livestodc and storage and handling equipment for field crops 

 are centralized and large scale. There is no system of production credit for small-scale producers. 

 There are many parallels with the situation that prevailed in southern sUtes at the end of the 

 American Civil War. 



