287 



STATKMBMT OF 

 8TBVBV A. MOCOY 



North American Export Grain 

 Association Incorporated 



Introduction 



Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

 the Subcommittee today. I am Steve McCoy, President of the North 

 American Export Grain Association (NAEGA) , the national association 

 of U.S. grain and oilseeds exporting companies and cooperatives. 



I have been invited to present some general observations on 

 the current grain situation in Russia and the CIS Republics, not as 

 a representative of NAEGA, but as an individual who has travelled 

 extensively in the former USSR (FSU) in recent years; and had 

 occasion to reflect on this important aspect of the overall U.S, 

 and U.S. -FSU trade picture. I am happy to do so. I will be 

 brief. 



Russian Heeds 



Let me begin by addressing the overall Russian food situation 

 on the micro-level, with an emphasis on nearby Russian grain needs. 

 There has been some dispute on that point. 



What we see today in Russia is not a case of absolute, but of 

 relative need for foodstuffs. There is no starvation in the 

 country. There is, however, severe deprivation affecting the most 

 exposed elements of Russian society: children, the elderly, 

 students, and those, like common soldiers, forced to live on very 

 minimal fixed incomes. 



Hyperinflation has had a dramatic impact on Russian standards 

 of living. Brakes have been applied by the government to some 

 rises in food costs. However, along with the general rise in 

 prices, the price of staple goods has also skyrocketed for most 

 consumers, bringing with it a widespread fear of basic food 

 insecurity; and concomitant threat of social and political unrest. 



It is as a hedge against such potential unrest that Russian 

 authorities have sought to import between 16 million metric tons 

 (mmt) and 18 mmt of grain in 1993. U.S. imports would, ordinarily, 

 comprise between 8 mmt and 10 mmt of this total. 



Failure on the part of the United States to provide the means 

 to import such quantities of grain would not, of itself, constitute 

 collapse of the Russian food system. Nevertheless, it would 

 undercut an already fragile food supply situation (particularly 

 viewed from the micro perspective) . It would result in hardship 

 for the average Russian family. 



Availability of low-cost foodstuffs in state shops in major 

 Russian cities is poor by American standards. More abundant, 

 better quality food can be purchased at commercial stores and 

 markets, but not at prices that all persons can reasonably afford; 



