72 



Eaatcrn Europo and tho Sovlot Union ahould convlnoo ua that 

 public ownorahip ia not on odldont Inatitutlonal airangoracnt 

 for tho production ofinalorial gooda and aorvicoa, Including 

 wood. Tho Eaatorn European example alaoahould convince ua 

 that centralized bureaucratic planning ia not a UBcful meana 

 of promoting environmental quality. Thoae countrica are tho 

 moat highly polluted in tho world. 



Tho National Forcat aystcm la an example of government 

 owncrahlp of the meana of production of timber which ia 

 dcmonatrably inofndcnt aa well aa being highly vulnerable to 

 political Interdiction. The coata ofadminlatcring timber aalea 

 on tho National Forcsta are ordera of magnitude higher than 

 in the case of similar operations on private lands, and some- 

 timcB exceed revenues. Tho bottomless pocket of the federal 

 treasury enables this to happen. The discipline of the bottom 

 line prevents it from happening on private landa.Lcgialati vely- 

 produced controversy and bureaucratic paralyala surround* 

 Ing tho adminlatratlon of the National Forcat system comes 

 too dose to tho problems of tho central-planning paradigm to 

 be lightly diamissod. 



Political dcbatea over proposed polldea tend to bo rela- 

 tively short-sigh tod. The Imperative of elected oflldals Is their 

 next election campaign, and the electorate may bo not able to 

 assodate adverse consoquonccs appearing much later with 

 earlier polidea adopted for the sale of short-run political 

 expcdiendes. The electorate also appears often to be vulnor- 

 able to alick political propaganda. One needs only to count the 

 number of times "tho last redwood" haa been "aaved" to make 

 the poInL 



Estimates of the short-run costs of policy changes derived 

 from the Input-output method of estimating economic impacta 

 are obvioualy useful In the policy debates. Forest land ownora 

 who will bear many, but not all, of the costs of more restrictive 

 environment regulations are underatandably Interested in 

 responding to spodnc requesta for impact eatimates in defend- 

 ing thdr Interest. But analyaia that Ignores poaslble longer- 

 term consequences induding those aaaodated with changing 

 inatitutlonal lirrangementa ahould be labelod dearly with the 

 caveat Rmptnr warning. 



A basic and unstated premise underlying forest policy in 

 California (aa well aa elsewhere) is that the free, private 

 market docs not work efTidontly In forestry and must there- 

 fore bo replaced by comprehensive government planning. 

 Poilcy-makera need to oonsidorcarefully whether government 

 intervention predicated on thia basic assumption Is correct, 

 namely: That alleged "market failures" readily can bo cor- 

 rected by Bubstltuting bureaucratic planning for the decen- 

 tralized planning Implldt In the market mechanism. 



Tho citizens of the state have a strong Interest In the 

 preservation of private property righta. Opposing positions 



