82 



In my view a Congressional rejection of NAFTA would be a "shot heard around 

 the world." It would be read across the globe as a seachange, marking a U.S. retreat 

 from our traditionally strong advocacy for open markets and expanded trade. 



As the Secretary of State pointed out, a U.S. failure to approve NAFTA would un- 

 dermine Mexico's capacity to cooperate with us on vital cross-border issues that af- 

 fect millions of Americans. 



Second, it would send a chilling signal about our willingness to engage in Latin 

 America at a time when so many of our neighbors are genuinely receptive to co- 

 operation with the United States. 



Third, it would hand our major economic competitors in Europe and East Asia a 

 clear opportunity to gain an advantage in what should be natural and growing mar- 

 kets for us. 



Fourth, it would undermine our position as a negotiating partner on global trade 

 agreements, like the Uruguay round, which are vital to the economic renewal of the 

 United States. 



NAFTA is good economic policy and good foreign policy. 



RESPONDING TO THE OPPOSITION 



NAFTA was negotiated by a Republican President and endorsed, and strength- 

 ened, by his Democratic successor. More than 40 of the Nation's Governors — Repub- 

 lican and Democratic — support NAFTA, and they are the government officials with 

 the most direct responsibility for economic development. Virtually everyone involved 

 in business, large and small, across the board, supports NAFTA. Yet it is no secret 

 that NAFTA is bitterly controversial; that the opponents are well organized and 

 strongly committed; and that their arguments have been resonating with people 

 across the country. 



NAFTA comes along at a time of great economic insecurity in this country. Bill 

 Clinton became President because he had a plan to address weaknesses in our econ- 

 omy, reflecting 20 years in which we followed misguided economic policies and ne- 

 glected the foundation of our economic strength. Jobs have been lost; our manufac- 

 turing base did go through a period of serious erosion; the fact that many companies 

 did move offshore lends a touch of vivid reality to the frightening arguments of the 

 opponents. But many of the opponents have been playing fast and loose with the 

 facts, dealing with a complex issue through a combination of inaccuracies, mislead- 

 ing statements, and outright falsehoods. It is time to puncture the myths that oppo- 

 nents of NAFTA are trafficking in. Statements made by President Clinton, myself, 

 and other administration officials last week, this week, and in ensuing weeks are 

 designed to provide factual information on this critical issue. 



CONCLUSION 



All Americans agree that we cannot respond to the challenge of a changing world 

 by drifting, content to accept the result of other nations' trade and economic strate- 

 gies. We need our own strategy, which builds on our strengths, faces our weak- 

 nesses, and responds to the challenges and realities around us. 



We would ask the opponents of NAFTA: does walking away from NAFTA seem 

 like good trade and economic strategy? Can you envision Japan or the EC — if they 

 were in our position — rejecting a deal like this? Would either of them kick sand in 

 the face of their third biggest, and fastest growing, trading partner? Would they opt 

 for the status quo, the unbalanced relationship, where Mexico keeps the tariff and 

 nontariff barriers it chooses to keep? Would they ever be willing, in one unthinking 

 lurch, to throw away the friendship and progress that have characterized the past 

 7 years, dramatically reversing the historic pattern of mistrust and antagonism? 

 Would they conclude, as the NAFTA opponents apparently have, that it would be 

 easier, somehow, to cooperate with Mexico on the environment, controlling drug 

 traffic, or illegal immigration, if NAFTA were defeated? 



This administration did not negotiate the NAFTA. Moreover, Bill Clinton as a 

 presidential candidate was sharply critical of the economic and trade policy of his 

 predecessors. When confronted with the need to make a decision on NAFTA, he ap- 

 proached it very skeptically. There were powerful political reasons for opposing it. 



But when he studied it, he found that NAFTA— particularly if strengthened by 

 supplemental agreements — would be strongly in the economic interest of the United 

 States. It was not a favor that we were doing for Mexico. It would benefit both coun- 

 tries, and Canada as well. It would not solve all our Nation's economic problems, 

 but it would be an important piece of the economic strategy that we were putting 

 in place to build the world's most productive and competitive economy. 



The administration has the responsibility of convincing Congress and the country 

 that NAFTA is in the national economic interest, and we intend to do so. I am con- 



