40 



So, these are a few of the reasons we think that it is clearly in 

 the U.S. interest to pursue a strong legally binding regime. But to 

 get there from here will require a substantial effort. The text that 

 emerged from the March conference that other people have men- 

 tioned is in fact tepid, as you described, Mr. Chairman. Its con- 

 servation provisions are exceedingly weak, and the text is riddled 

 with qualifiers that severely undercut its effectiveness. 



In addition, it has no effective measures to deal with the fun- 

 damental problem here, which is overcapacity. It does require na- 

 tions to deal with overcapacity, but it contains no specific require- 

 ments and no specificity in terms of how nations are to go about 

 that. 



There have been different ideas that have come up during this 

 process for dealing with overcapacity. One of them was suggested 

 by the Canadians early on in the process. It would eliminate the 

 subsidization of domestic fleets that fish on the high seas once cer- 

 tain biological thresholds have been crossed. But, to date, those 

 have received little support in the United Nations context. 



A key question that remains is how much of this text or what 

 succeeds it will become legally binding, and how much of it will be 

 left to languish in some nonbinding declaration. 



That, in our view, is a key question that will have to be resolved. 



Strengthening the text will require vision and leadership on the 

 part of the United States and a clear signal that the United States 

 is serious about achieving a strong legally binding regime that will 

 change the status quo and that will put the world's fisheries back 

 on a sustainable track. We have begun to see this leadership 

 emerge in recent weeks, but the United States will have to become 

 much more aggressive if we are going to achieve a sustainable re- 

 gime for these species. 



Shifting quickly to flagging. As everyone knows here, reflagging 

 is a serious obstacle to the conservation of and management of 

 international fisheries. Vessels can simply reflag to avoid controls. 

 And this has been a major problem in virtually every area of the 

 international waters. 



The agreement imposes important requirements on flag states to 

 control their vessels. We strongly support this agreement. We think 

 it is a credit to the State Department, under the able leadership 

 of Ambassador Colson, and we think it ought to be affirmed by the 

 Senate. 



On driftnets, I would just note that Greenpeace has done an up- 

 date of the report you referred to, Mr. Chairman, in 1994, in which 

 it documents continued driftnetting by the Italian fleet. We strong- 

 ly support. Senator Stevens, your point that the United States 

 needs to become much more aggressive in enforcing the driftnet 

 ban. 



And I think that really raises the question about enforcing inter- 

 national agreements and how you do that. And one of the things 

 that I know is in Mr. Benton's testimony — he calls for a reaffirma- 

 tion of the driftnet ban, and that is an idea which we would strong- 

 ly support in the context of the United Nations. 



With respect to the Donut Hole agreement, we would just reit- 

 erate the support that others have voiced for that agreement. 

 Again, it is a very strong agreement. I do not think anyone is inter- 



