47 



The outcome of these negotiations could have significant ramifications on the suc- 

 cessful implementation of the Central Bering Sea convention. 



Up until recently, the position of the United States has been that the outcome 

 of the conference would be a non-binding set of guiding principles. This was agree- 

 able to U.S. given the general nature of the negotiating text and the principles 

 which would be established. Now, the U.S. position has changed, and the U.S. has 

 agreed to this document becoming a binding agreement. This causes us concern on 

 three counts: 



1. The text contains very general language which we believe will set an unaccept- 

 able "lowest -common-denominator" as the standard for regional agreements to ad- 

 dress straddling stocks. This low standard could hamper efforts to develop strong 

 requirements in future regional arrangements, and could impede successful imple- 

 mentation of the Central Bering Sea convention in the near term. Overalls the text 

 dealing with straddling stocks needs to be more specific regarding the standards for 

 regional agreements and the obligations of fishing states to conserve these stocks. 



2. The text reaffirms the rights of coastal states, such as the United States, to 

 manage straddling stocks inside their respective 200 mile zones, but does not 

 strengthen the role of the coastal states in managing such stocks outside their zone. 

 In the case of the Bering Sea, where the donut hole is less than 10 percent of the 

 area and most of the spawning occurs in U.S. waters, we believe strongly that the 

 U.S. has the primary interest in those stocks. If the United States is going to be- 

 come party to this new agreement as well as UNCLOS, then this issue must be re- 

 solved in favor of the coastal states. 



3. The conference text, and presumable the new agreement, would subject the 

 United States to compulsory binding international arbitration in order to settle dis- 

 putes over the conservation and management of straddling stocks. Under the terms 

 of the current text, such binding arbitration would apply to disputes in the Bering 

 Sea, and could be brought about by nations which are not parties to the Central 

 Bering Sea convention. This convention took roughly 5 years and ten rounds of ne- 

 gotiations to conclude. In the end we were able to negotiate an agreement between 

 six nations which establishes internationally significant precedents for enforcement, 

 and which contains very important conservation and management provisions which 

 protect U.S. fish stocks and strengthens U.S. management of those stocks through- 

 out their range. We question whether or not it is in the best interests of either the 

 Aleutian Basin pollock stocks or the United States to then place this agreement and 

 our interests under the authority of an unidentified international tribunal. 



With the recent change in U.S. policy regarding the outcome of the UN con- 

 ference, the State of Alaska believes that it is crucial that the U.S. thoroughly re- 

 view the negotiating text, develop sjsecific proposals to address these issues, and not 

 accede to the agreement unless these issues are successfully resolved. 



IMPLEMENTATION OF NPAFC 



The second area of concern is the implementation of the North Pacific Anad- 

 romous Fish Convention (NPAFC). The NPAFC was intended to take the place of 

 the old INPFC, which included not only matters pertaining to salmon, but other spe- 

 cies as well. It was to be an important forum for international cooperation and co- 

 ordination of scientific research and fisheries enforcement. This convention, and the 

 commission it established, was clearly intended to be a centerpiece for international 

 cooperation regarding high seas fisheries in the North Pacific. 



By the terms of the convention, directed fishing for salmon and steelhead in the 

 convention area is prohibited. Trafficking in salmon taken in violation of the treaty 

 is prohibited. The incidental taking of salmon in a non-salmon fishery, e.g., the high 

 seas squid fishery, must be reduced to the maximum extent practicable, and the 

 burden of proof is on the fishing party to show that this requirement is being met. 

 The retention of incidentally caught salmon is also prohibited. 



The convention sets new standards for high seas enforcement. It gives Parties the 

 right to board, inspect, seize and detain any vessel of any other Party which is 

 found to be in violation of the terms of the treaty, or any such vessel for which there 

 are reasonable grounds to believe is of)erating in violation of the treaty. Actual trial 

 and punishment will be carried out by the fiag state. 



The convention also extends authority to the commission to address issues per- 

 taining to the conservation of ecologically related species, which are broadly defined 

 so as to include marine mammals, sea birds, and other species which are in associa- 

 tion with salmon in the convention area. There are specific obligations for coopera- 

 tion and coordination in scientific research, the collection and sharing of fisheries 

 data, and other information necessary to attain the purposes of the convention. 



