48 



However, the provisions regarding ecologically related species and scientific re- 

 search remain contentious, as Canada has sought to reduce the ability of the com- 

 mission the address these issues. Canada is instead pushing for these issues to be 

 placed under the authority of the North Pacific Marine Science Organization, com- 

 monly referred to as PICES. The difficulty here is that PICES is a broad-based sci- 

 entific organization more attuned to large scale, multi-disciplinary ecological re- 

 search than it is to the collection, storage, and processing of basic fisheries statistics 

 or the management of high seas fisheries and their impacts on associated species. 



This conflict is weakening the mission of both the NPAFC and PICES, and U.S. 

 policy is unclear as to its resolution. The problem could be resolved by acceding to 

 the Canadian demands, which would diminish the role of the NPAFC and substan- 

 tially modify the role of the PICES organization. We would not advocate this ap- 

 proach. However, if this were the decision, we believe that the treaty establishing 

 PICES would need to be renegotiated to include specific obligations for data collec- 

 tion and exchange similar to those in the NPAFC, and also to provide for PICES 

 to engage in enforcement and management activities within the convention area. 



The other approach is for the U.S. sections of both NPAFC and PICES to adopt 

 consistent policies regarding these issues and the roles of the respective organiza- 

 tions. In this case, the U.S. position should be that the NPAFC should assume the 

 role of primary responsibility for high seas management and enforcement for fish- 

 eries in the convention area, including a strong scientific research role covering a 

 broad range of species in order to meet obligations for conservation and manage- 

 ment in the convention area. PICES would assume the primary role for inter- 

 national cooperation in multi-disciplinary oceanographic and ecological research in 

 the North Pacific. The two organizations would exchange data, and coordinate as 

 needed on specific issues. If this is the path chosen, then it is imf)erative that U.S. 

 policy be consistent and well coordinated. 



U.S. BECOMING SIGNATORY TO UNCLOS 



The third area of concern is the pending adoption of the UNCLOS by the United 

 States and its impact on the ability of the U.S. to effectively achieve national goals 

 tc conserve living marine resources on the high seas. Like the text from the UN 

 straddling stocks conference, UNCLOS requires parties to submit to binding inter- 

 national arbitration which in most instances will be conducted by an international 

 tribunal. The decisions of such a tribunal are binding on all parties to the dispute, 

 and are generally not subject to appeal. 



If the United States becomes a full party to LT^CLOS, then these provisions shall 

 apply. This could have serious implications for not only future conservation issues 

 wnich might arise and therefore be subject to such a procedure, but also for some 

 of the significant gains which have been made in recent years on driflnets, strad- 

 dling stocks, highly migratory stocks, and other species. 



For example, the driflnet moratorium could be called before such a tribunal once 

 UNCLOS comes into force. And it is likely, in our view, that the driflnet issue would 

 be one of the first matters brought before such a tribunal. If the U.S. were a party 

 to UNCLOS, then we would be oound by the decision of the tribunal. In the event 

 that the tribunal reinstated the driflnet fishery, the U.S. would be in the unfortu- 

 nate position of trying to renegotiate multiple international agreements to manage 

 these fisheries even though we Know from past experience that such agreements are 

 largely ineffective, virtually impossible to enforce, and very expensive. Most impor- 

 tantly, our options for bringing pressure to bear on the fishing nations would be se- 

 verely constrained, thus further ensuring the likelihood that any such agreements 

 would be weak and not adequate to protect U.S. interests or the broad range of liv- 

 ing marine resources which would be affected of these fisheries resume. 



Similarly, the effectiveness of existing regional agreements would be called into 

 question. States which are not party to the NPAFC or the Central Bering Sea con- 

 vention could challenge these agreements, and potentially undermine their imple- 

 mentation. For example, a non-party could announce the intention to fish in the 

 donut hole, and be rejected by tne parties to the donut hole convention. This non- 

 party could then take the dispute to the international tribunal. If the tribunal rules 

 against the parties to the convention, then there will be a new entrant in the donut 

 hole fishery, which is something we have staunchly tried to prevent. If the tribunal 

 rules that the management or allocation scheme provided for in the convention un- 

 fairly discriminated against this new entrant, then there would be even a further 

 erosion of the agreement. 



Mr. Chairman, these problems are not insurmountable. They are, however, very 

 serious and deserve careful attention. If the U.S. secures specific language at the 

 UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks affirm- 



