112 



Historically, UPOVs member states do not include developing nations. In 

 reality, few Third World countries have the infrastructure to enforce breeders' 

 rights and other forms of plant intellectual property rights. Given the threat of 

 trade retaliation, however, Third World nations that are signatories to the GATT 

 accord will now be obligated to adopt intellectual property rights for plants, be it 

 through patents or a sui generis system. As noted above, extension of breeders' 

 rights legislation in developing nations is likely to contribute to crop genetic 

 erosion. It may also jeopardize future conservation and exchange of plant genetic 

 resources. 



"First to File" for Determining Eli gibility is Inconsistent with U.S. Preference for 

 "First to Invent" 



If the US ratifies the UPOV 1991 Convention, the use of date of determination 

 would be replaced by the use of date of filing for protection as the basis for 

 determining eligibility for protection. 6 While seemingly minor and limited in 

 scope, this change in U.S. law governing plant intellectual property is inconsistent 

 with other US intellectual property law, and may ultimately work to the 

 disadvantage of small breeders/ "inventors.'' Recently, the WIPO Patent 

 Harmonization Treaty was rejected by the US Patent and Trademark Office, largely 

 because small inventors objected that it did not give priority to the US system of 

 first-to-invent. Will ratification of UPOV 1991 set a precedent in US intellectual 

 property law and jeopardize the long-standing principle of first to invent? 



Cttneintnnn 



Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this Subcommittee. We hope 

 that you will use this hearing as a reference point for further debate and 

 discussion on this issue, prior to taking further action on H.R.2927. 



Proposed amendments to the U.S. Plant Variety Protection Act have 

 implications far beyond our borders. What may, at first glance, appear to be an 

 innocuous issue, is extraordinarily complex and controversial. There is a great 

 deal of uncertainty, as well as conflict, regarding the potential impacts of both 

 plant breeder's rights and plant patenting. In addition, new genetic technologies 

 are being developed much faster than society can develop socially responsible 

 policies to assimilate them. 



The PVPA was designed to give plant breeders adequate incentives to 

 conduct research and develop new plant varieties by granting them limited 

 monopoly rights. Amendments to the PVPA now seek a disproportionate set of 

 benefits for commercial plant breeders, without corresponding benefits for 

 farmers and society. 



The evolution of plant intellectual property laws in recent history (both in 

 the United States and internationally) shows a consistent strengthening of the 



international Union for the Protection of New Varieties, Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of 

 the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Geneva, March 4-19, 1991, 

 Article 10. 





