65 



tially operating on individual fishing quotas. When each country 

 had used up its share of bycatch, its boats had to stop fishing. 



Our domestic fleet, on the other hand, is treated as one huge en- 

 tity. Until each fisherman is made accountable for his actions, our 

 efforts to achieve effective conservation of our resources will be sty- 

 mied. Without individual accountability, we will be unable to re- 

 duce bycatch and discards because the dirty fishermen can con- 

 tinue to hide their activities behind the rest of the fleet. 



This situation is one of the major reasons the members of our as- 

 sociation are strong proponents of an individual transferable quota 

 system. A carefully constructed ITQ program will stop the race for 

 fish and will reward the clean fishermen while penalizing the dirty 

 ones. 



The most effective action Congress can take to achieve the long- 

 term health of our fishery resources is to direct the councils to es- 

 tablish systems that promote individual accountability. There is 

 currently no mention of this in the act, and that omission has led 

 to the precarious situation we find ourselves in today. A good fish- 

 erman is flexible and creative, and there is no better stimulus for 

 his innovation than knowing that he will be sitting on the beach 

 if he does not fish responsibly. Thank you. 



The Chairman. How do I write that into the act? 



Ms. Graham. I thought you were going to ask that. 



The Chairman. Calling for fishermen to exercise individual re- 

 sponsibility, is like saying we cannot have anybody any other than 

 individually responsible Senators. We are looking at each other and 

 wondering how we got here. How do I get that individual account- 

 ability? How did it work with the foreign fleet? Educate me. Tell 

 me about it. 



Ms. Graham. The North Pacific council tried several different 

 times to do this and ran into, apparently, a constitutional problem. 

 The council agreed to a penalty box system, where if someone 

 catches too high a percentage compared to the rest of the fleet, he 

 has to go sit on the beach for a while. But NMFS said it couldn't 

 be implemented. 



Right now we have a vessel incentive program, and if one boat 

 has a higher bycatch rate than the rest of the fleet, then he has 

 to pay a high penalty. 



The Chairman. Is that a penalty for good fishing, if I am catch- 

 ing more than Senator Stevens? 



Ms. Graham. Not on a rate basis, a percentage basis. 



The Chairman. I see. 



Ms. Graham. But the trouble is that the success of the program 

 hinges on what is provable in court, and in trying to figure out how 

 to make that work. NOAA general counsel has not been com- 

 fortable. That is why we have been thinking that an ITQ program 

 might be get individual accountability. Each fisherman would hold 

 quota shares for the different species, both his target species and 

 his bycatch. If he catches more than the number of quota shares 

 he has, he either has to buy more, or he has to sit on the beach, 

 or he has to figure out a different way to fish, which is actually 

 what we think will happen. This would really motivate a fisherman 

 to try different gear types to keep from running out of quota shares 

 for halibut, for instance. 



