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harvests. The Council has remained steadfast on this issue despite repeated at- 

 tempts by some segments of the fishing industry, supported by advice from some 

 elements within NMFS, to raise the cap beyond this level. Similarly, when con- 

 fronted with the dramatic overfishing in the Bering Sea donut hole by foreign fleets, 

 it was the NPFMC which closed the Bogoslof pollock fishery inside our 200-mile 

 zone, moved to prohibit U.S. vessels from fishing in the donut hole, and called for 

 a moratorium on all fishing in the Central Bering Sea to protect the stocks. If it 

 had not been for the action of the NPFMC to maintain the two million ton cap Ber- 

 ing Sea stocks would be in poor shape today, and the damage done by the donut 

 fisheries would have had even greater effects on fisheries in the U.S. zone. 



The other criticism which is leveled specifically at the NPFMC is that the Alaska 

 majority controls the Council process, and works in concert to disadvantage those 

 participants in the fishery which come from outside the state. The example most 

 often cited is the inshore/offshore allocation issue. 



An analysis of the record shows otherwise. Of 905 recorded votes on motions and 

 amendments during the 24 NPFMC meetings from January 1988-September 1992, 

 only 14 votes found the six Alaska appointees in unanimity. For the other 891 

 times, the votes of Alaska appointees were not unanimous (98.6 percent of the 

 votes). On eleven of the fourteen occasions when the Alaska appointees voted to- 

 gether, the Secretary's representative, the Regional Director of the National Marine 

 Fisheries Service for Alaska, also concurred. Thus, only three votes out of 905 (0.3 

 percent) were decided on by a six to five majority consisting solely of Council mem- 

 bers recommended by the Governor of Alaska. In the case of the inshore/offshore 

 recommendation, the final vote was a very nearly unanimous 10-1 decision. 



A related issue pertains to the role of the Secretary. Presently, the Councils act 

 in an advisory capacity. They may recommend fishery conservation and manage- 

 ment measures, which in turn must be approved by the Secretary and adopted Dy 

 regulation promulgated by NMFS. This advisory role is strengthened in that the 

 Secretary, in most instances, must either accept, reject, or reject in part a Council's 

 recommendation. In theory, this effectively provides the Councils with a more sub- 

 stantive role than they would have if they were simply an advisory body. 



Certain segments of the commercial fishing industry, sport fishing interests, and 

 the conservation community have called for changes to the Act to strengthen the 

 hand of the Secretary and to reduce the powers of the Councils. One proposal would 

 limit the role of the Councils to addressing allocation issues only, ana leave the set- 

 ting of allowable harvest levels to NMFS. Other proposals would have the Councils 

 act in a simple advisory role, with all substantive decisions resting with the Sec- 

 retary. 



In the North Pacific this could result in a serious weakening of fishery conserva- 

 tion measures. For example, the NPFMC adopted a ban on roe stripping over the 

 objections of the NMFS. The NPFMC has reduced harvest on depressed stocks of 

 POP and other rockfish in the Gulf of Alaska to initiate rebuilding over the objec- 

 tion of the NMFS. The.NPFMC has also maintained the two million ton cap on Ber- 

 ing Sea harvest despite efforts from some segments of industry and NMFS to raise 

 the cap. If the ability of the NPFMC to implement these fishery conservation meas- 

 ures is curtailed, then it is likely that these efforts to conserve our nation's fishery 

 resources will cease as well. 



Recently the Secretary has overturned a number of carefully crafted conservation 

 and management measures recommended by different Councils. In several cases, 

 the Secretary has substituted his own management plan for that of the Council 

 plan, often with little or no justification provided to explain the action taken. In 

 many of these instances, the Secretary has acted contrary to section 304 by sub- 

 stituting Secretarial amendments for Council recommendations without providing 

 the Council an opportunity to correct or modify the plan to meet the national stand- 

 ards. In one particular case in the North Pacific, the Secretary overturned conserva- 

 tion measures to protect and rebuild depressed stocks of rockfish despite clear evi- 

 dence of their depleted condition. 



In order to reaffirm the Council's primary regulatory role, the Congress needs to 

 provide stricter controls on the Secretary's ability to arbitrarily override a Council 

 recommendation, and to require detailed findings on the part of the Secretary ex- 

 plaining the reasons for the decision. Section 304 could be amended to provide that 

 Council proposals are automatically endorsed unless the Secretary is able 'to specify 

 the reasons the Council recommendation is substantially at odds with the ecological, 

 biological, social, or economic evidence reviewed by the Council, is arbitrary or capri- 

 cious, or lacks a rational connection with the national standards. The Secretary 

 should be prohibited from substituting his management plan for a Council rec- 

 ommendation unless such findings are made and the Council is provided an oppor- 

 tunity to address any deficiencies identified by the Secretary and fails to do so. 



