282 



- 38 



over 60 ptrctnt of those questioned either believed that low yield 

 cigarettes were "safe" or they weren't sure. ^' 



A confidential memo, written on March 24, 1981, from J.J. Morgan to H. 

 Cullian and J.C. Bowling, executives with Philip Morris, USA, described 

 the following statement on the company's advertising strategies to be 

 presented to the Coaaunl cations Connlttee for review: 



"The Connuni cat ions Comaittee is coonitted to Instituting national 

 advertising to reinforce the :ffloker, his choice to smoke and the 

 custom of smoking. This will be accomplished by: 



--attacking bad research 



--attacking researchers themselves, where vulnerable 

 —attacking the unreasonableness of legislative segregation 

 —exposing the bureaucracy and personal aggrandizement of certain 

 anti-smoking organizations. 



In effect, the Communications Committee Is readying advertising to 

 stand up to the industry's detractors and by that means support our 

 smoking population." " 



A 1981 review of public opinion surveys by the Federal Trade Commission 

 concluded that: 



"Many smokers falsely believe that smoking 1s not dangerous to them 

 If th«y smoke low-'tar' and low-nicotine cigarettes. "... many 

 smokers wtw switched to new allegedly 'safer' cigarettes would have 

 quit wokinq altogether had they not been influenced by advertising. 

 In this w«y. advertising and promotion of cigarettes claimed to 

 provldt 'health protection' or to be 'lowest' in dangerous 

 constituents successfully offset the demand-decreasing impact of 

 publicity concerning the adverse health consequences of smoking." ^ 



In Its own Tobacco Reporter , the tobacco industry acknowledged that people 

 were smoking lower yield cigarettes because of their belief that these 

 brands are healthier. The publication discussed the fact that the 



