623 



Mr. James Johnston. Sometimes the greatest attempts at tech- 

 nology fail to provide consumers with what they want, despite 

 whatever advantages that product might bring. 



Mr. Bliley. Mr. Campbell, aside from taste, wasn't the initial 

 failure of Next also attributable to the fact that there were already 

 a number of brands on the market with virtually no nicotine, and 

 consumers therefore did not perceive the even greater reduction of 

 nicotine in Next as a selling point? 



Mr. Campbell. That's correct. There is some major brands that 

 have under one milligram of tar and under 0.1 milligrams of nico- 

 tine, so that made the competitive marketplace difficult. 



Mr. Bliley. Do you think the marketing of Next was hindered 

 by petitions from the Coalition on Smoking OR Health which ar- 

 gued that the elimination of nicotine from the product made it a 

 drug under the food and drug laws? 



Mr. Campbell. Yes. And I think Mr. Johnston pointed out the 

 irony of that in his prepared remarks. 



Mr. Bliley. Did members of the Coalition on Smoking OR 

 Health ironically argue to the FDA that Philip Morris' denicotized 

 Next cigarettes posed a greater health hazard to smokers than or- 

 dinary cigarettes? 



Mr. Campbell. That's exactly correct, sir, 



Mr. Bliley. Isn't that petition position totally contrary to what 

 they and Dr. Kessler are now saying, which is that products with- 

 out nicotine should be the only ones allowed in the marketplace? 



Mr. Campbell. Yes. I think, as many of my colleagues said, there 

 is great ironies here. We do something and we get — for it, and we 

 do something and we do something else and we get — for that as 

 well. So, it's difficult for us, sir. 



Mr. Bliley. What was Philip Morris' objective in marketing it's 

 denicotized Next cigarettes? 



Mr. Campbell. Our objective was to try to get a piece of the mar- 

 ketplace, because we try to provide what the public wants. 



Mr. Bliley. When you say, "a piece of the marketplace," you 

 know, I've heard different figures, but 1 percent in the market- 

 place, of all sales of cigarettes, what does that mean in dollars? 



Mr. Campbell. Oh, I guess, about $150 million, sir. 



Mr. Bliley. So that's a reason to be very competitive, I would 

 think. 



Mr. Campbell. I think it is, yes, sir. 



Mr. Bliley. Mr. Johnston, at last week's hearing, data was pre- 

 sented from the Surgeon General's Report which showed a dra- 

 matic reduction in tar and nicotine levels over 30 years. Dr. 

 Kessler, during his testimony, showed us several graphs which 

 showed us dramatically different results. His graphs showed nico- 

 tine increasing, and tar decreasing over the period 1982-1991. 



First, let's examine the first graph, which is taken from the 1989 

 Surgeon General's Report. This graph documents the decline of tar 

 and nicotine from the 1950's to the 1990's. For both tar and nico- 

 tine there has been a 69 percent reduction. 



[The graphs referred to follow:] 



