98 



c'rnl and director of a prestigious laboratory, the Council was 

 able to attract an illustrious scieniific advisory board, which 

 culled through proposals from a who's who of American scien- 

 tists who sought its research grants. Over the years, it has doled 

 out more than $200 million. 



But the Council's role was never just research. It was largely 

 a creature of Hill & Knowlion, the public relations ftrm, which 

 cigarette merchants retained when (he mouse research came out. 

 Hill & Knowlion installed the Council in the Empire State Build- 

 ing in New York, one floor beneath its own ofnces, with one 

 of the PR Turn's staffers as the supposedly independent research 

 council's executive director. Hill & Knowlion also began pub- 

 lishing a newsletter that reported such news items as "Lung 

 Cancer Found in Non-Smoking Nuns," and it helped authors 

 generate books with titles like "Smoke Without Fear" and "Go 

 Ahead and Smoke." 



Some people, including many in the news media, were skep- 

 tical of the Council. "To reporters, the Council was never in- 

 dependent," says Earl Ubell, a veteran science reporter at 

 WCBS-TV in New York. "It was a wholly owned subsidiary 

 of the tobacco industry." But in the interest of balance, jour- 

 nalists writing on smoking and health routinely included the 

 Council's views. 



And many smokers lacked the professional skepticism of 

 reporters. "You would have to have lived in that era to under- 

 stand — they kept providing false reassurances, so I had no 

 idea that smoking was so very dangerous," says Janet Sack- 

 man, who once appeared in ads as Miss Lucky Strike and who 

 now has throat cancer. 



As early as 1958, however, the Council had strong intima- 

 tions from studies it fmanced that smoking could be dangerous. 

 "Cigarette smoke condensate is a weak mouse skin carcinogen," 

 said a Council-financed study completed in thai year. 



Ensuing Council-financed research found more links to dis- 

 ease. In 1961, a siudy of 140 autopsies at a Veterans hospital 

 in Iowa City, Iowa, said "a history of cigarette smoking is sig- 

 nificantly related to the incidence of carcinoma." In 1963, 

 researchers at Philadelphia General Hospital and the Universi- 

 ty of Pennsylvania linked chronic smoking to earlier coronary 

 artery disease and a higher Incidence of coronary occlusion. 



The Council summarized such results in its annual reports, 

 but it often chose other research lo stress to the public. Ms. 

 Cohen, who wrote (he summaries, cites a 1965 study (ha( said 

 pregnant women who smoked had smaller babies and were 

 more likely to give birth prematurely. But the industry in 1982 

 submitted to Congress a study (he Council hadn't financed, say- 

 ing tha( smokers had no greater risk of premature babies and 

 (hat low birth weight wasn't a problem. 



"In the '60s." says Ms. Cohen, "there was so much bad 

 news about smoking that there really wasn't much the CTR 

 could put out, but anything they could find they would use." 



THE LAWYERS STEP IN 



By 1964, keeping (he case open was no longer jus( shrewd 

 public reladons; It had become a legal imperadve. As more 

 Americans came to believe smoking could kill, (he number of 

 tobacco liability sui(s jumped to 17 from seven the year before. 

 And in that year, (he Surgeon General labeled smoking a heal(h 

 hazard. 



I( "was a serious, s(unnlng shock," says Mr. Bowling, (he 

 former Phillip Morris director. "That's (he s(age a( which (he 

 lawyers became a lo( more involved." 



Needing a defense from science as never before, yet dread- 

 ing (he legal exposure (ha( adverse research would bring, (he 

 indus(ry crea(ed wUhin (he Council a Special Projects division 

 — with lawyers, not sciendsis, a( (he helm. Much of wha( i( 

 did was shrouded in mys(ery. "Everything was cloak-and- 



dagger," recalls John Kreisher, a former as$ocia(e sciendfic 

 director of the Council. "We weren't allowed on (heir floor." 



The core of (he lawyers' operadon was a vast database, stor- 

 ing (he world's li(era(ure on (obacco and heal(h, da(a on foes 

 and sira(egy documents. The lawyers began shuttling the globe, 

 looking for research and expert witnesses. They sough( out 

 s(udies suppordng causadon of lung cancer by fac(ors o(her 

 (han smoking and research suggesdng (he complex origin of 

 all diseases linked to tobacco. 



Overtures lo scien(is(s usually were handled by outside law 

 firms, especially Jacob. Medinger, Finnegan & Hart in New 

 York. It also served as counsel (o (he Council, and i(s Edwin 

 Jacob (ook (he lead role a( the Special Projects unit. This ar- 

 rangement offered crucial advan(ages. Notes Roy Morse, a 

 former research chief at R.J. Reynolds: "As soon as Mr. Jacob 

 funded" a scieiuific study, "i( was a privileged reladonship and 

 it couldn't come mto court" because of legal rules protecting 

 attomey<lient communications. "So they could do projects that 

 they could bury if they chose." 



How of(en (hey may have done (hat is unclear, because 

 1 ,500 Coimcil documents are under seal in a federal suit in New 

 Jersey, withheld under the attomey<lient privilege. In any case, 

 the industry had other options, such as halting funding after 

 an inidal phase. Mr. Jacob and the firm of Jacob Medinger 

 declined (o commen(. 



SCIENTISTS SIGN UP 



In 1972, (he Special Projeas unit gave Hugh Fudenberg. 

 an immunologist. funding (o de(ermine whe(her some people 

 are gene(ically predisposed (o emphysema. Early resuUs Indi- 

 cated up to 10*^0 mighi be. Dr. Fudenberg planned "to warn 

 high-risk people not (o smoke," he says. bu( before he could 

 his funding was discondnued wlthou( e\- 

 planadon. "They may have cu( me off because l( would have 

 been negative for ihem." he specula(es. 



A researcher named Geoffrey Ashion learned (he limits of 

 (he Council's independence In 1976. He was invi(ed by Mr. 

 Jacob (o s(udy whe(her (here might be some genedc factor un- 

 derlying boih smoking and certain diseases. Bu( the study never 

 got funded. Dr. Ashion says the lawyer told him "the presi- 

 dems of (he (obacco companies had (urned down ihe proposal 

 because they didn't think (he outcome would be useful to 

 Ihem." 



This case, like several others, points up the sometimes- 

 perplexing reladonship be(ween scientists and the (obacco Coun- 

 cil. Dr. Ash(on says he was "very apprehensive" abou( casi- 

 ing his lo( wiih (he Industry. What finally won him over? "No( 

 (0 shock you, but sciendsis are always looking for money lo 

 further Iheir research," Dr. Ashion says. 



Likewise, a pharmacologisi. Charles Puglia. did a special 

 projeci for (he Council's lawyers from 1979 to 1981. aUhough 

 he believed smoking to be dangerous. He explains: "It was early 

 on in my career and It got me sianed wuh a labora(ory." 



While (hese sclen(is[s hesiia(ed lo accept tobacco funding 

 bu( finally said yes, others, such as Theodore FInley. hesita(ed 

 and finally said no. Dr. Finley, encouraged by Jacob Medinger 

 lawyers (o apply for cigare((e research funding, decided lo ex- 

 amine wheiher emphysema can resul( from a reducdon (hai 

 smokers face in a pro(ective lining of the lung. He soon backed 

 ou(. "If my theory was correci, i( would have discredited 

 clgare((es," he says. "Bu( it would be hard (o (alk about (he 

 evils of (obacco while being supported by (hem a( the same lime. 

 This was dirty money — I felt like a proslilu(e." 



The researchers (he Council cul(iva(ed mos( assiduously 

 were (hose of a differen( breed: contrarians whose work dis- 

 pu(ed (he perils of tobacco. For instance, James F. Smith did 

 two controversial s(udies in (he 1960s and 1970s saying smoke- 



