165 



jured patient from finding them has distorted U.S. Government 

 policy for 30 years. 



On January 11, 1964, Dr. Luther Terry issued the first Surgeon 

 General's report on smoking and health. In his report. Dr. Terry 

 and his distinguished advisory committee concluded that, "Ciga- 

 rette smoking is causally related to lung cancer in men", but found 

 the data for women less extensive though it pointed in the same 

 direction. 



The report also concluded that, "a relationship exists between 

 cigarette smoking and emphysema, but it has not been established 

 that the relationship is caused." As for that disease, the 1964 Sur- 

 geon General's report said that, "a causal relationship has not been 

 established." The report could only associate higher mortality of 

 cigarette smokers with many cardiovascular diseases. 



The word "addiction" does not appear in the first Surgeon Gen- 

 eral's report except to be rejected in connection with smoking. In- 

 stead, the report says, and I quote, "The habitual use of tobacco is 

 related primarily to psychological and social drives reinforced and 

 perpetuated by the pharmacological actions of nicotine." 



Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, compare what the 

 tobacco companies knew about cigarettes and nicotine at the very 

 time Dr. Terry and his committee were preparing the first Surgeon 

 General's report. 



On July 17, 1963, 6 months before Dr. Terry issued his report, 

 one Brown and Williamson executive wrote — and I quote "We are, 

 then, in the business of selling nicotine, an addictive drug." 



The industry also had far more evidence of the health hazards 

 of cigarettes with respect to cancer, respiratory ailments, and heart 

 disease which it consciously decided not to share with the Surgeon 

 General in order to preserve its profits. Instead, tobacco company 

 executives chose to launch a big lie public relations and lobbying 

 campaign to dispute what they knew to be true. What was the re- 

 sult? 



In 1965 I was working on the White House staff of President 

 Lyndon Johnson. The administration was pressing to put warning 

 labels on cigarettes. The tobacco industry wanted no labeling or la- 

 beling as weak as possible. The law which Congress passed in 1965 

 provided only that packages of cigarettes carry labels saying, "Ciga- 

 rette smoking may be hazardous to your health." 



That relatively weak admonition was not changed until 1970 and 

 again in 1984 as evidence of the dangers of smoking accumulated 

 and thanks to the work of this subcommittee, I might note. It was 

 not until 1972 that the Federal Trade Commission was able to ex- 

 tend the warning to cigarette advertising as well as packaging. 

 Had the administration and the Congress known what the tobacco 

 industry knew, the warnings in the health public health program 

 of the U.S. Government would have been much stronger. 



In December 1966 when President Johnson and I were discussing 

 his State of the Union Speech, I suggested that he recommend leg- 

 islation to require tobacco companies to reveal the tar and nicotine 

 content of cigarettes in their packaging and advertising. The De- 

 partment of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Federal Trade 

 Commission wanted the President to propose such legislation. 



