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tobacco industry, designed to head off any litigation, legislation, and regulations 

 involving the tobacco industry and its products. 



A 1965 internal Council memorandum to W.T. Hoyt from Simon O'Shea summarized 

 the history of the Council and its effectiveness as follows: 



The Council has, during the last two years, passed through a period which 

 was dominated by events surrounding the preparation and issuance of the 

 Surgeon G«nerars Report and subsequently by congressional consideration 

 of cigarette labeling legislation. During this period the general tone of the 

 Council's public information activities has changed considerably and much 

 staff activity has been devoted to assisting with the problems posed by the 

 Surgeon General's Committee and the legislative deliberations. 



The period of primary focus on governmental and legislative concerns may 

 now be ending. However, the provision of the labeling bill which will 

 require armual reports by various govermnental agencies to the Congress 

 undoubtedly will affect policy in the future. We should at the earliest 

 moment try to learn whether these periodic reports will have an effect of 

 continuing to mute the industry's statements in the scientific field. It 

 certainly must be considered that an open program of scientific discussion 

 might draw governmental attacks on the Council. 



A 1972 memorandum from Fred Panzer, Vice President of the Tobacco Institute, to 

 Horace R. Komegay, President of the Tobacco Institute, summarize the motives and 

 objectives of the industry: 



For nearly twenty years this industry has employed a single strategy to 

 defend itself on three major fronts - litigation, politics, and public opinion. 



While the strategy was brilliantly conceived and executed over the years, 

 helping us win important battles, it is only fair to say that it is not - nor 

 was it intended to be - a vehicle for victory. On the contrary it has always 

 been a holding strategy, coasisting of: 



- creating doubt about the health charge without actually denying it, 



- advocating the public's right to smoke, without actually urging them to 

 take up the practice, and 



- encouraging objective research as the only way to resolve the question of 

 health hazard. 



The memorandum goes on to lay out a strategy for dealing with the tobacco and health 

 issue for the future, including advancing the idea of convincing the public that "cigarette 

 smoking may not be the health hazard that the anti-smoking people say it is because 

 other alternatives are at least probable." A review of all the existing evidence that has 

 come to light indicates that the Council for Tobacco Research, and its predecessor the 

 Tobacco Industry Research Committee, were an important part of the tobacco industry's 

 attempt to mislead the public and the Congress about the dangers of cigarette smoking. 

 The industry's specific purpose was clearly to head off litigation, legislation, and 

 regulation. 



For the last forty years the tobacco industry has been able to conduct its business outside 

 the public eye. Unfortunately for the American public and the estimated 10 million 

 people who have since died from cigarette related diseases since 1964, the tobacco 



industry was able to convince the Congress that regulation of its product was 

 unwarranted, that they voluntarily would conduct "independent" research on the health 

 risks associated with tobacco, openly provide their findings to the public and the 

 Congress, and take appropriate steps to protect the public if such findings found 

 smoking to cause disease. 



Tne evidence that has come to light indicates an urgent need for the federal government 

 to assume both oversight and regulatory control over tobacco products. The special 

 treatment afforded an industry which produces this nation's single most preventable 

 cause of death must come to an end. 



