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their own lobby, in the interest of increasing their share of the 

 budget at the expense of proposed competitive grants funding." 



Pressure from DSDA. Some time ago, many USDA administrators 

 decided that they might as well go along with the earmarking system 

 and try to secure the funds necessary for research in whatever 

 manner possible. Today administrators identify powerful Members of 

 Congress and work with the local ARS laboratories and universities 

 to secure pork barrel appropriations. 



Ernest Moore has described the deliberate scheming of certain 

 administrators. He reports that beginning in 1960, ARS officials 

 started laying plans to establish large laboratories in Arizona, 

 Georgia, Florida, Missouri, Mississippi, North Dakota, South 

 Dakota, and Texas — the home states of several members of the 

 congressional appropriations committees. 



Even when the Administration proposes facility closures, 

 administrators do not always support their own budget proposals. 

 USDA personnel cite instances when they have tried to close certain 

 facilities, only to be overruled by Congress. As a result, the 

 administrators say they see little reason to engage in the 

 political battles necessary to clean up the system? it is hopeless, 

 they contend. 



But it is not always that simple. For example, Moore 

 describes a conflict between the Johnson Administration and 

 Congress in Fiscal Year 1966, the first time an Administration 

 proposed facility closing. The Administration's budget called for 

 closing 20 ARS field stations and reducing spending for the 

 Beltsville facility. In the end. Congress restored 75 percent of 

 the budget. The justification? An ARS administrator admitted to 

 a congressional committee that he did not agree with the proposed 

 cuts, thus undermining the Administration's position and leaving 

 Congress with mixed signals. 



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