20 



natories? And if it is a number of countries who are violating, what 

 can we do to enforce the agreement? If the agreement is not strong 

 enough, what can we do to strengthen it? 



And if the problem is nonsignatory countries, is there anything 

 we can do to bring compliance from nonsignatory nations? I don't 

 even know who to ask the question, so anybody who feels compe- 

 tent to do so, jump in. 



Mr. Hesse. I will take a stab at it. Maybe we will go around the 

 table. I think a little bit of the history of the bluefin problem may 

 be instructive there. Part of the reason that NMFS came up with 

 the two-stock working hypothesis, separating the east and west in 

 1980, was to allow the western Atlantic countries (meaning the 

 United States, Canada and Japan), to take unilateral conservation 

 sacrifices in the face of unresponsive Eastern European govern- 

 ments and Mediterranean governments. That was part of the 

 reason. 



There is some scientific evidence that suggests there may be two 

 stocks, a different spawning area in the Mediterranean and so 

 forth. And I think those countries in the east have resisted the im- 

 plementation of a program as complex and as large as what we 

 have in the United States to restrict bluefin catches. 



It is very difficult, as evidenced by this hearing, for example, to 

 adequately distribute the resource and perhaps these countries 

 haven't felt capable of controlling their own fishermen. Perhaps 

 they feel that since they are faced with such an abundance of blue- 

 fin there (perhaps as a result of our conservation sacrifices on this 

 side of the Atlantic), there is no real need for them to abide by any 

 quota restrictions. It appears that perhaps trade restrictions are 

 one of the only threats that people in Eastern Atlantic and Medi- 

 terranean countries will listen to. 



Clearly, since 1982, the United States has embarked on a strate- 

 gy of conserving as a way to set an example, and we have taken a 

 65 percent reduction in our own landings already to further that 

 goal. All it has resulted in is further unrestricted fishing in the 

 eastern Atlantic. 



So I think we need to embark on a different strategy than an ad- 

 ditional 50 percent reduction for our fishermen in order to set an 

 example for our Eastern Atlantic counterparts. 



Thank you. 



Mr. Lancaster. Well, I hope somebody else will give a further 

 answer because that doesn't address whether these countries are 

 signatories or not. If that is the problem, and if the agreement is 

 strong enough in its enforcement mechanisms or if it needs to be 

 changed, and if it needs to be changed, why would we want to reau- 

 thorize it? 



Why would we not go back to the negotiating table and get a 

 stronger and more effective agreement that will address some of 

 these concerns in the eastern Atlantic? 



Mr. BoGAN. Mr. Lancaster, Ray Bogan. With regard to whether 

 it is signatory or nonsignatories, it is both. We have problems with 

 reflagging, which is being addressed to some extent. That is where 

 nations which are under ICCAT try to avoid the restrictions of 

 ICC AT by reflagging, for example. That is a problem which is being 

 addressed in other venues, as well as through ICCAT. 



