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Fisheries Subcommittee -7- October 20, 1993 



to create formal advisory panels, exempt from the Federal Advisory 

 Committee Act (FACA), to provide recommendations to the agency....". We 

 also support modifications to ATCA and Magnuson that directs the 

 Secretary to appoint plan development teams to recommend plans for the 

 Secretary's review and adoption. We support language developed by 

 Bluewater Fishermen's Association for submission at this hearing with 

 the addition of specific reference to Inclusion of knowledgeable fishermen 

 on any such highly migratory "planning teams". 



Strengthen the ATCA Provision Against Disadvantaging U.S. 

 Fishermen 



One of the more controversial issues arising from the 1990 Amendments 

 of ATCA and the Magnuson Act are the respective provisions dealing with 

 the issue of highly migratory measures Ihat place U.S. fishermen at a 

 competitive disadvantage with foreign fishermen engaged in the same 

 fisheries. Section 304(f) (3) (E) of the Magnuson Act and ATCA Section 6 

 (c) (3) are the relevant sections. We believe that the legislative history 

 is clear that the language of these two sections was developed to achieve 

 two principal U.S. fishery objectives and national policy. 



The first objective was to recognize that international agreements are 

 best negotiated from a position of equality, national credibility, strong 

 and un-politicized scientific evidence and mutual respect for each 

 member nation's unique fishery conservation perspective. Congress also 

 recognized that unilateral fishing restrictions, to the extent that they 

 contribute to a conservation goal, reduce the incentive for timely 

 international agreements to jointly conserve the resource. Whatever 

 short or long term benefits result from unilateral management are shared 

 by the international fishery while the costs are borne singly by only the 

 implementing nation. The notion that unilateral restrictions facilitate 

 international agreements by "setting an example" or "showing commitment 

 and resolve to the fishery problem" is recognized as an essentially 

 bankrupt negotiating stratagem given the realities of the effects of 

 unilateral actions. Congress never intended to sacrifice the Interests of 

 U.S. fishermen and support industries to prod international management. 



The second objective was to assure that U.S. fishermen be held to the 

 same standard of implementation and interpretation of the international 

 agreement/program as other participants in the fishery. This objective 



