Dr. James Baker -2- October 11, 1993 



. which there was not, or the catch per unit effort Is up again); and the fact 

 that an analysis of the tagging program carried out by Canada the last 

 three years indicates a total mortality rate for giants that is considerably 

 lower than predicted by the assessment. 



However, this letter is not the place to reexamine the assessment. Our 

 concern is that once again U.S. fishermen are being called upon to 

 sacrifice so that others can reap the harvest. In this latest instance we 

 are threatened with a 50% cut in quota (representing at least $15 million 

 in exports to Japan) and at the same time Japanese fishermen are allowed 

 to take three times their share of the bluefin quota in a contiguous fishery 

 that exposes the silliness of drawing an arbitrary stock dividing line. 



What is it going to take to get Miami scientists and NOAA to step back and 

 look at the big picture? Something is wrong and unfair. The western 

 fisheries were cut 55% during the 80's and the eastern Atlantic and 

 Mediterranean catches increased by 31%. The western fisheries were cut 

 another 10% for 1992/93 and the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean 

 increased by another 11% for 1992. The eastern Atlantic and 

 Mediterranean fisheries now account for more that 93% of the total catch 

 and the proposal from Miami is to slash the western fisheries by another 

 50% for 10 more years? A management strategy for Atlantic bluefin that 

 relies on a maximum of 3 1/2% of the total catch (i.e. the new western 

 quota) being constrained by a minimum size and spawning area protection 

 is not conservative or balanced. 



This is the unfortunate reality of how ICCAT manages bluefin to 

 accommodate the controversial two stock working hypothesis. ICCAT over 

 the years, and for mainly political reasons, has gone from managing 

 bluefin m the Atlantic on a single stock basis to one of considering there 

 may be separate stocks in the east and west with mixing sufficiently 

 limited to allow these stocks to be managed on a separate basis. The. 

 division of the Atlantic into east and west for stock assessment was by 

 Parrack (under instructions by Bill Fox) in 1980 who noted: 



"A separate analysis was required assuming a completely isolated West Atlantic 

 population so that it was necessary to compile the catch under that assumption. Since 

 lonflline catch per effort show a continuous distribution of fish across the Atlantic and 

 mark-recapture data document frequent transatlantic movement (Brunenmeister 

 1979). the identification of catches from the hypothesized western stock was not 

 obvious. Therefore, in order to define catches from a separate stock for analysis 



