64 

 Dr. James Baker -3- October 11, 1993 



purposes, a geographical separation line approxlnnately equidistant from eastern and 

 western continents was arbitrarily defined as beginning at 40«W 60»N and 

 proceeding to 40»W 10°N...." 



As you can see the original placement of the line at 40* in 1980 was 

 arbitrary and without any biological basis or by reason of the location of 

 fishing areas. The next reference to the line in the ICCAT literature is 

 found in the management recommendations of "Panel 2 on Bluefin" (ICCAT 

 1982) where the line was moved west to 45° without a documented 

 reason. Here the line has remained. 



The result of dividing the ocean by this line is that catches west of the 

 line are counted as coming out of the western "Stock", those east of the 

 line from the eastern "Stock". Since all the U.S. and Canadian catches are 

 in our EEZ's they fall into the western stock. Japan, on the other hand, has 

 a high seas longline fishery. Beginning about 1985 the Japan fleet began 

 to shift their traditional fishing operations off the U.S. and Canadian 

 coasts east because of the restrictive western quota. By 1988, 

 substantial catches were coming from the area just east of 45''W. In the 

 past three years these catches have increased to the point where they 

 exceeded the estimated replacement yield for the entire 

 western stock, and were triple the allowed Japan quota for the west. 

 About two-thirds of this Japanese catch is taken less than 150 miles 

 from the line (i.e. about a one day leisurely swim for bluefins), assuming 

 that the reported positions of the catches are accurate. 



The tragedy and absurdity of this situation is apparent unless 

 their is no real concern for true bluefin conservation and 

 fairness. Because of a political boundary, catches of bluefin are 

 assigned to an unregulated eastern hypothetical stock when common sense 

 and prudence tells us these catches, which are very large, have to be 

 considered in any assessment of the western stock (as long as we are 

 going to continue this political game with two "hypothetical stocks"). We 

 are disturbed (not surprized) that our Miami scientists are not concerned 

 about this and that the Working Group, under Miami's grip, did not include 

 these catches in the assessment. We ask you what is the motivation for 

 Miami's strict insistence on concentration on the mechanics of an 

 assessment of catches west of 45°W in light of this obvious problem? 



Before we can accept the need for additional unilateral sacrifice that will 



