224 



ENCLOSURE II ENCLOSURE II 



Corps had excluded several factors from calculations used to 

 determine that the costs of constructing bypasses at two dams 

 outweighed the benefits and that the inclusion of these factors 

 could have led to the opposite conclusion. In addition, we found 

 that the Corps did not adequately involve fish and wildlife 

 agencies or other groups, as its regulations require, in making its 

 decisions. We determined that the Corps was not obligated to 

 restore the numbers of migrating fish to a specific level and 

 therefore had no benchmark to assess the need for additional fish 

 migration projects. 



On the basis of these findings, we recommended that the 

 Secretary of the Army direct the Corps, in consultation with other 

 interested groups, to establish a mitigation objective and 

 determine which measures, such as bypass facilities, were necessary 

 to meet the objective. We also recommended that, in performing 

 future cost-benefit analyses, the Corps take such steps as using 

 validated models to project impacts on fish stock and consulting 

 with other agencies and other parties involved in resource 

 management. In response, the Army stated that the Corps was 

 developing mitigation objectives and expected to have a detailed 

 analysis in 1993 or 1994. In addition, the Corps agreed to adopt 

 our recommendations regarding cost-benefit analyses. 



In 1992, we reviewed past actions taken to address declines in 

 salmon runs, together with the costs of these actions. We also 

 reviewed the results of studies and research that evaluated the 

 effectiveness of the salmon recovery measures undertaken. We found 

 that, since 1981, federal agencies and regional organizations had 

 spent over $1.3 billion (in 1991 dollars) to construct and operate 

 fish hatcheries, construct fish ladders and other facilities to 

 assist salmon in their migration to and from the sea, improve 

 salmon habitats, and conduct research to learn more about salmon or 

 to assess and improve salmon runs. The effectiveness of the 

 actions taken has varied by the type and location of the action. 

 For example, hatcheries have been successful, but problems have 

 resulted from mixing wild and hatchery-bred salmon; facilities to 

 assist salmon in their migration, such as bypass screens and fish 

 ladders, have also had differing results, depending on the location 

 of the dams and the type of salmon. 



A 1993 follow-up report identified the potential economic 

 costs and effectiveness of future actions that could be taken to 

 further protect endangered and threatened salmon stocks . We found 

 that a preliminary estimate of the impacts of additional salmon 

 protection measures on employment would not be available until mid- 

 1993 at the earliest. Preliminary estimates of the direct net 

 economic costs of some potential salmon protection measures range 

 from $2 million to $211 million annually (in 1990 dollars). These 

 protection measures would alter stream flows to improve the 



8 GA0/RCED-93-133R, GAO Products on Bonneville Power Administration 



