571 



biases continue to skew the perspective of the federal dam- 

 operating agencies away from such an approach. The Army Corps 

 has failed to budget for Salmon Strategy measures scheduled for 

 1994, yet it energetically studies a proposal to build a 350-mile 

 closed pipe, complete with 3 5 rest stops, to flush young salmon 

 to the ocean without interrupting hydrosystem operations. The 

 cost: a mere $6 billion, 5 times more than the estimated cost of 

 improving river migration conditions through drawdowns.^ The 

 Bureau of Reclamation will soon complete a study of options for 

 building a new dam to provide salmon flows (at costs that 

 probably range from $200 to over $500 per acre foot) , but refuses 

 to consider self-financing water efficiency improvements with 

 greater potential to increase flows in an EIS.^ And Bonneville 

 advocates the barging of fish around dams as a temporary measure 

 during poor water conditions, then uses the existence of barging 

 to argue against improvements in river conditions.^ Although 

 each of these agencies is struggling to redefine a single-purpose 

 mission that no longer seirves it or the region well, numerous 

 similar examples illustrate just how constraining those outdated 

 missions can be, and how contrary to an emphasis on ecosystem 

 restoration. 



The region has little choice about changing the old ways: those 

 ways simply aren't working any more. The tunnel vision of 

 single-purpose agencies now encourages conflict over scarce 

 resources where cooperation is essential. The federal government 

 can no longer afford to subsidize inefficient water and energy 

 use, nor can the region afford the consequences of those 

 subsidies for fish, wildlife, and water quality. The pressure 

 for reform comes from more than the salmon crisis. Indeed, 

 changes in agency practices have become an economic imperative as 

 the competition over limited water resources spirals upward. 



The sooner the federal agencies stop fighting salmon protection 

 measures and start concentrating on how to encourage more 

 efficient and more compatible uses of the Columbia River, the 

 quicker a difficult but necessary transition will be completed. 

 As the ancient forest struggle demonstrates so clearly, delay 

 tactics will not stave off the need for a reckoning; they will 



■■■U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Salmon Passage Notes, December 

 1992, pp 2 and 4. 



^ The Bureau has consistently refused to include Snake River 

 Basin water management improvements in the System Operation 

 Review, the only comprehensive study the agencies are conducting 

 of long-term salmon restoration measures. 



^ In 1992, when additional flows were released in the Upper 

 Snake, Bonneville stored the flows rather than passing them 

 through the Columbia, arguing that barged fish wouldn't know the 

 difference. 



