32 



out of work, and we tell them we don't have enough time to look at 

 the economics, they are going to 



Mr. Johnson. Mr. Congressman, people were going to be put out 

 of work no matter what we did. This decision is about which people 

 would be put out of work and which ones would not. 



As it turns out, there will be people out of work in both sectors 

 as a result of this decision. That was a foregone conclusion. There 

 is simply much less whiting available this year than there was last 

 year. Making more jobs out of it was not possible. 



Chairman Wyden. So, did the Department have any cost benefit 

 analysis that specifically looked at the economic impact this deci- 

 sion would have on the folks in this audience and the folks on the 

 Oregon coast, other than what Mr. Warrens put together? 



Mr. Johnson. I think that is the sum total of the economic anal- 

 ysis. We knew there were going to be jobs lost in Oregon. We knew 

 there were jobs going to be lost in Seattle. 



Mr. KoPETSKi. So, you decided that it was OK if they were unem- 

 ployed in Oregon and you would let Seattle keep working? That 

 was the decision? 



Mr. Johnson. In effect, the reduction in the harvest of the Seat- 

 tle-based fleet is much more dramatic than the reduction in the 

 harvest of the shore-based fleet, both in terms of percentage and in 

 terms of tons of product. 



This decision was not made to favor Washington over Oregon, or 

 anjrthing of that kind. The geographic location of the jobs that 

 would be lost was not taken into consideration. 



We were dealing with a reduced abundance of fish. We didn't 

 know what was the best use of that fish because the economic data 

 were not there. The decision was made to come as close to the 

 status quo as possible on the belief — and perhaps this is mistak- 

 en — that what happened in 1992 was a reasonable situation. 



Mr. KoPETSKi. Then, Mr. Chairman, why did they change their 

 mind? 



Mr. Johnson. Why did who change their mind? 



Mr. KoPETSKi. Commerce, 2 or 3 weeks into the season? 



Mr. Johnson. What happened is that was a technical problem 

 that also I can take some responsibility for. When we made the ini- 

 tial decision to approve the 30,000 metric tons reserve for shore- 

 based, we were advised by the professional staff at the National 

 Marine Fisheries Service that during the open access fishery, 

 shore-based operators would harvest approximately 12,000 metric 

 tons of Pacific whiting. 



That was based upon the relative performance of the two fleets 

 in the preceding year. Essentially, during the open-access fishery in 

 1992, the shore-based vessels harvested about one metric ton of 

 whiting for every nine metric tons harvested offshore. 



This year, for one reason or another, the shore-based enterprises 

 did not perform at that level during the open-access season. When 

 it became apparent that they weren't going to harvest the 12,000 

 metric tons that we had anticipated they would, we issued another 

 rule to ensure that they could. 



That is what resulted in the final decision to stop offshore proc- 

 essing at 100,000 metric tons. There was an error. We monitor 

 these things. We try to achieve what we set out to achieve. We try, 



