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At its July meeting, the Council decided to analyze the shoreside proposal (Option 1) and one 

 of the catcher boat proposals (Option 4), but not a proposal favoring at-sea processing interests. 

 The 1992 allocation provisions and a no allocation alternative were also adopted for analysis, 

 although the Council made it clear that it intended to allocate the resource in order to protect the 

 various sectors from pre-empting each other. In September, the Council received the preliminary 

 analysis and staff reports, several hours of oral public testimony and numerous written public 

 comments. The Council adopted two major options and several sub-options for inclusion in the 

 final analysis. Specific tonnages and percentages for the options were proposed and the Council 

 identified its preferred alternative. Under the preferred alternative, the Council selected a sliding 

 scale framework which would establish an allocation to vessels delivering to shore-base 

 processing plants and provide an opportunity for catcher-processors and vessels delivering to at- 

 sca operations. The second alternative would have provided separate percentage allocations for 

 vessels delivering shoreside, catcher vessels in general (i.e., with no restrictions on place of 

 landing) and catcher-processor vessels. The sub-options provided a range of f)erccntages to each 

 group. 



The analysis presented to the Council in November 1992, attempted to assess the change in 

 private efficiency (i.e., the net benefit or net cost reflected in the cost-benefit analysis) and also 

 consider any information on non-market factors. These included social considerations (such as 

 described in Section 6 of the analysis and public testimony) and effects on the biological 

 resources (Section 3). Council members discussed their goals and objectives for the groundfish 

 fishery, the federal mandate as established by the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and 

 Management Act and its national standards, and other relevant policies and statutes. The Council 

 recognized that each individual reviewer and Council member would have to rely on his or her 

 own individual experience and judgement because there were valid differences of opinion, 

 contradictions between goals and objectives, and a general lack of important information. Again, 

 several hours of public comment and hundreds of written comments were received, which were 

 split evenly between for and against the preferred alternative. Many proposed and supported a 

 new alternative that would have provided a greater share to the offshore sector. 



The cost-benefit analysis was not available prior to the meeting, so the authors presented a 

 lengthy and detailed summary. The analysis identified specific problems where information was 

 lacking, such as certain operating costs and prices. Surimi is the predominant product, and prices 

 had been in such flux, the analysis assumed all participants receive the same price. The analysis 

 concluded the economic efficiency cost of producing surimi is about the same for onshore and 

 offshore operations. Shoreside appeared slightly more efficient overall due to use of waste 

 products for meal and oil. However, the analysis pointed out that meal data were very uncertain. 

 The conclusion was that there was very little certainty that any option was much better than any 

 other, but it was clear that some regulation is better than no regulation. Council members 

 questioned the authors extensively with regard to the available information, the assumptions in 

 the analysis and the conclusions, making sure they understood what the analysis said. The 

 authors acknowledged the great deal of uncertainty and reminded the Council it would need to 

 exercise its own judgement about several issues. 



The Council's Groundfish Management Team (technical experts) advised that, although the 

 quantitative analysis did not clearly indicate which alternative was more beneficial, several 



