110 



unlike the recent whiting decigion, the Commerce Department refused 

 to release documents relating to the North Pacific allocation 

 decision. 



Responding to concerns about the more visible North Pacific 

 Council scheme. Under Secretary Knauss directed NMFS to prepare a 

 cost/benefit analysis to determine the economic impact to the 

 Nation of reallocating 400 million pounds of pollock and cod away 

 from the at-sea sector. The analysis demonstrated that the 

 allocation would result In losses exceeding $100.0 million. 



On the eve of the final decision, the Alaska's three-member 

 Congressional delegation met with then-White House Chief of Staff 

 Samuel Skinner, Two of the three Republicans comprising the 

 delegation were engaged at that time in tough reelection campaigns. 

 They urged approval of the allocation proposal despite the weight 

 of the evidence that the allocation was illegal, unfair and unjust. 

 The North Pacific allocation was approved within 48 hours. 



Shortly thereafter. Senator Bob Packwood, who was similarly 

 engaged In a difficult reelection campaign, met with then-Commerce 

 Secretary Barbara Franklin regarding the once rejected whiting 

 allocation. Following that meeting. Secretary Franklin overrode 

 the recommendations of NMFS' fishery management professionals, and 

 approved a 1992 Pacific whiting allocation plan that quintupled the 

 amount of whiting availnblA to AhnroRldn prnr.flSRora ahnvn the TavrI 

 processed in 1991. 



This was how the Bush administration set fisheries policy — 

 arbitrary and capricious council actions were approved, and the 



