150 



b<^ts and ftctoiy trawlers. We also CTqvessed concerns atxHit the effect <»i price 

 a))d market freedom that fishermen would find under the counciVs plan that 

 gilarantocd shoreside processors as much of the harvoi^t as they are able to use. 

 ittere are indications in the final rule that Commerce had some of these same 

 concenvt. It is possible that if they had substituted a plan of their own, it might 

 h^ve included the provisions we fuJced fbr. 



It ^appears to us that the Commerce Dqjartmcnt was trying to find a way to address 

 ^i» Council's stated concern about preemption of harvest opportunities for 

 shorebascd ba.sod boats white ensuring ^ir treatment for the other harvesters. The 

 C^incirs allocation was expressed in tonnages, rather tlian in pcrcmtages as we 

 hud reqncstedt thus requiring the at-sea fleet to bear all the bivdcn of conservation 

 8t|low stock levels. In addition* tiie Councirs plan would have encouraged 

 Increfu^cd investment in shoreside processing, at the expense of existing American 

 processors. At the same time, it would not have provided market opportimities for 

 m^re catcher boats, but simply have given more fish to the few boats that already 

 hjjve shoreside nvuiketii, contrary to the Council's stated concern for the limited 

 erjlfy fleet 



Because the council based its allocation scbcnie on processing rather than 

 harvesting, the traditional fishemicn have been placid at the mercy of the 

 processors regarding the price paid fbr the fish, an allocation that is, in i»actical 

 terms, made to processors guarantees tiiem a source offish. As a result they hove 

 th^ fi-ecdom to reduce the price they offer to fishennen, establish fishing seasons to 

 th^ir prefbrence, and vertically integrate. This happened in Alaska last year when 

 $i% ofihe pollock allocation was guaranteed to shoreside processors. The plants 

 w^e assured of an adequate supply of pollock, the price was dropped ^m $.15 to 

 $.()7. h is interesting to note that the oflshore catcher veascU had a relirtively 

 snjianor reduction in price from 1992 to 1993 than did the catcher vessels that 

 delivered shorctdde. Many of the plants have purchased their own cat<4icr boats 

 Slid can exert fiirther control through their vertically integrated fleets. 



Congress has already addressed this situation in the Magnuson Act and in the 

 legislation known aa the Processor PFeferenoe AmendmenL 



National Standard #4 of the Magpnsoa Act (see Table H) is spocifio. ft assumes 

 thlt allocations will be made to fl^rmcQ, not processors, and says that the 

 allocation should be fiiir and equitable to all such |isherm<m and that no particular 

 individual, corporation or aititx can acquire an excessive share. The Pacific 

 Council allocated based on the locatioa of the processor (shorcbascd, at-sea). Mat 

 they should have done was base the atlocatioa on the type of barve.'^er (traditional 



