46 



The third point has already been mentioned, and that is that 

 international programs demand long-term commitments. This is to 

 some extent a fallout from the preceding point. International deci- 

 sionmaking tends to be slow. It is also inherent in the nature of 

 science. As we meet here, there are planning committees that are 

 looking at proposals for drilling in the Pacific Ocean in 1989 and 

 1990, and I think that kind of planning cycle is not atypical of 

 other large science enterprises. 



It is easy in this situation to get into a chicken-and-egg syn- 

 drome, and we have had a bit of this problem in drilling. The part- 

 ner governments do not want to commit until they are sure that 

 the major partner, which is the United States, is committed to a 

 given course of action. On the other hand, U.S. policymakers want 

 to have reasonable assurance of international participation before 

 they commit. 



I think the benefit we have had has been in the attitude of our 

 congressional committees and of the Federal policy agencies, who 

 have simply recognized the essential nature of a U.S. commitment 

 in starting the new program and have been prepared to accept 

 risks, carefully defined and limited, but nonetheless to accept an 

 element of risk and step out forward. The foreign governments, I 

 think, have complied beautifully in that we have asked for and re- 

 ceived a commitment in principle to the entire 10-year planned life 

 of the program. 



I have made, finally, the rather obvious point, but it is some- 

 times difficult to do in practice, and that is that you must consider 

 the interests of all the partners in the management and governing, 

 in the administrative side of an international program. 



In ocean drilling, the first foreign involvement was with an ongo- 

 ing U.S. program, and the partners did not really expect to be sig- 

 nificantly involved with the management. When we planned the 

 Ocean Drilling Program, their attitude was quite different. They 

 expected, and we were able to negotiate, I think, very suitable ad- 

 ministrative involvement. 



The larger question is, of course, for you to judge, and that is to 

 what extent this experience is in fact a model for others. I find my 

 own feelings a bit mixed in this regard. 



In ocean drilling, the United States is clearly the leader. We are 

 the majority player. If, indeed, the United States is going to partici- 

 pate in scientific activities where we are in the minority or in a 

 secondary position, I think perhaps the particular skills we need 

 for membership are different than the ones we need for leadership 

 in a project. 



The very nature of our program has resolved one problem which 

 Dr. Weisskopf alluded to. That is, ocean scientists have never had 

 the luxury of staying at home. They have always had to go to some 

 far-flung place to do their work. So we simply have not had the 

 issue, and we also do not have a large ground-based, highly visible 

 and very expensive fixed facility. 



I think the most important, though — and many people don't real- 

 ize this — ocean drilling is not a time-sharing proposition. This is 

 not the existence of a facility on which people take turns. Every 

 program is planned by the entire international group participating. 

 Every time the ship goes to sea, it is staffed by a totally integrated 



