69 



thanks to the Parliament, responded with vigor and preserved 

 naval leadership. 



Now, this anecdote illustrates four points pertinent to the task 

 force inquiry. First, even the mightiest industrial power cannot 

 ensure its future without foresight and leadership. Second, the bu- 

 reaucracy cannot always be counted on to provide that leadership. 



Third, the Parliament was wise to depend on the dynamic pri- 

 vate sector that had made Britain the world leader in the first 

 place, while the French Government, like the Soviet today, lacked 

 that private dynamism and had to crack the whip itself. And even 

 though France inaugurated the age of ironclads, as the U.S.S.R. did 

 the space age, she was unable to keep up with Britain. Fourth, all 

 this testifies to the wisdom of the committee's survey of U.S. sci- 

 ence policy. 



Now, it is often said that science is by nature an international 

 and cooperative enterprise, and that only suspicious governments 

 prevent it from being so. This I believe to be false. 



Throughout history, scientists have often been jealous of their 

 discoveries, resentful of competitors, prudent to serve their royal 

 patrons, or simply patriotic. Whether it be Leonardo in the court of 

 the Medicis, or the British and Prussian science academies arguing 

 whether Newton or Leibniz first discovered the calculus, or Vanne- 

 var Bush and Sir Henry Tizard swearing fealty to Roosevelt and 

 Churchill, scientists have usually placed civic duty before devotion 

 to a universal ethos. 



Even the Piltdown Man hoax of 1912 was sustained in part by 

 hopes that this resounding discovery might restore the prestige of 

 British science. 



To be sure, governments contributed heavily to international 

 competition in science. From the Royal Academies of the European 

 monarchs to the massive United States and Soviet research com- 

 plexes of today, governments displayed a growing appreciation of 

 the importance of science for military and economic security. 



Nevertheless, beginning in the mid-19th century, governments 

 also came to see, in limited cooperation in science, either common 

 gains to be made or national advantage for themselves. Over the 

 past century, three kinds of international cooperation have 

 emerged: 



First, what I call housekeeping cooperation, in which govern- 

 ments jointly support activities of an intrinsically global nature, 

 like the 19th century coastal and continental surveys, meteorologi- 

 cal or oceanographic services, or the sharing of the electromagnetic 

 spectrum by the ITU. Such cooperation is perceived by all parties 

 as necessary, whatever disputes may arise over policy. 



Second, there is ground-breaking cooperation in which govern- 

 ments jointly support basic research for the discovery of new 

 knowledge, like the International Polar Years of 1882 and 1932, the 

 IGY of 1957 to 1959, or United Nations' studies of drought, erosion, 

 endangered species, or bilateral experiments and conferences. Such 

 cooperation is perceived as discretionary but mutually beneficial, 

 whatever reservations may arise over cost. 



Third, there is what I call competitive cooperation, in which gov- 

 ernments each perceive benefit in collaborative research, but not 

 the same benefit. This is most problematical to policymakers, for 



