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times more on their national programs than on their cooperative 

 efforts. 



In European agreements, the French insisted on clauses allowing 

 them to apply jointly discovered know-how to their national effort 

 without being enjoined to share nationally derived know-how with 

 the others. 



What de Gaulle intuited was that our age of continuous techno- 

 logical revolution would not be an age of global integration, nor of 

 the triumph of communism, as Khrushchev boasted, but rather an 

 age of heightened self-sufficiency and competition, even neomer- 

 cantilism. 



For de Gaulle embraced the capitalist assumption that competi- 

 tion was the engine of progress, but also the Communist assump- 

 tion that competition was the solvent of community. A smaller 

 country like France could not afford chaotic competition within but 

 had to unite at home in order to compete with rival states abroad. 



In the 1960's, NASA offered scientific cooperation and perhaps a 

 subcontracting role to the Europeans. But their industrial lobby, 

 Eurospace, made explicit that the European goal was to acquire 

 prime contractor status for all space applications systems and not 

 to play little brother to the United States. 



Building on what they could derive from cooperation with 

 NASA, assimilate from American literature, or purchase from 

 American firms, the Europeans practiced a kind of Euro-Gaullism, 

 borne of resentment of U.S. dominance and a desire to play an in- 

 dependent role on the frontiers of science. 



The White House and Congress both endorsed space cooperation 

 as a matter of principle and good will, but U.S. policy in the early 

 space age was not naive. NASA's approach could be summed us as 

 "cooperation in science; competition in engineering." In other 

 words, NASA would launch foreign experiments and even foreign 

 satellites but not transfer technology that could feed into foreign 

 military programs or competitive economic systems. 



This was prudent, but as others have testified here, science and 

 technology can rarely be separated. Beginning with space science, 

 then moving to applications, the Europeans, Japanese, and Canadi- 

 ans caught up with the United States in one after another targeted 

 field and now compete for world markets in Government-subsi- 

 dized, neomercantilist fashion. 



Let us face the fact the U.S. power has been in relative decline 

 since the late 1940's and again since the mid-1960's. Our situation 

 is not unlike that of Britain in the years been 1900 and 1914. For a 

 century, Britain had enjoyed naval, financial, and technological 

 leadership. She was the keeper of the balance of power and defend- 

 er of human rights. 



But the industrial revolution inevitably spread to Europe, North 

 America, Japan, and finally Russia. By 1902, when Britain 

 emerged from the Boer War, a costly guerilla war not unlike Viet- 

 nam in its effects, she was still the world leader, but her relative 

 power had shrunk markedly. 



New industrial, naval, and colonial powers chipped away at Brit- 

 ish leadership in this market or that region of the globe. Foreign 

 technology surpassed the British in many fields, and all the other 



