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McDougalU Science Policy Task Force, page 4 



sLmpLy because they saw either common gains to be made or national 

 advantage for themselves. Over the past century, three kinds of 

 international cooperation in science have emerged: 



(1) "Housekeeping cooperation" in which governments support 

 joint study or management of actLvities of an intrinsicalLy global nature, 

 like the 19th century coastal and continental surveys, meteorological or 

 oceanographic services, or the sharing of the electromagnetic ^)ectrum by 

 the LT.U. Such cooperation is perceived by all parties as necessary, 

 whatever disputes may arise over pdicy. 



(2) "Ground-breaking cooperation" in which governments jointly 

 fund and perform basic research for the discovery of new knowledge, like 

 the International Polar Years of 1882 and 1932, the LG.Y. of 1957-59, UN 

 studies on drought, erosion, or endangered ^Decies, or the many bilateral 

 experiments in space science ^XDnsored by NASA. Such cooperation is 

 perceived as discretionary, but mutually beneficial , whatever reservations 

 may arise over cost. 



(3) "Competitive cooperation" in which governments each 

 perceive benefit in collaborative research, but not the same benefit. This 

 is most problematical to policy-makeirs, for such projects require trade- 

 offs between costs and benefits to oneself and tietween benefits to 

 oneself and benefits to others. "Big-ticket" items, indeed aU sharing or 

 transfer of technology, equipment, capital, ideas, or management skills 

 (such as joint development of a nuclear or laser fadHty, deep sea 

 laboratory, or space station) faU into this category. Such "competitive 

 cooperation" is perceived both as dis cretionary and a s a possible 



