78 



McDougalU Science Policy Task Force, page 5 



"give-away." The pros and cons of such "big-ticket" cooperation are well 

 treated in the O.T.A. studies on "Civilian Space Stations" and 

 "Competition and Cooperation In Civilian Space Activities," for which I 

 was proud to serve as an advisor. 



We tend to take for granted the diplomatic, scientific, and 

 fiscal value of cooperation in "Big Science" — President Kennedy said, "Let 

 us do the big things together" — and proponents have touted international 

 cooperation in ^>ace, for example, as a cement for alliances or detente, a 

 .moral substitute for arms racing, and a force for global integration. Yet 

 such hopes have often proven unrealistic both in domestic and foreign 

 policy. When the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 was debated. 

 Senators protested the giveaway to private industry of technology 

 developed at taxpayer expense. How much more would taxpayers of any 

 country, protest the giveaway of critical technology to a foreign nation? 

 When JFK made that appeal to the Soviets for a JDint moon landing. 

 Congress amended the NASA Appropriations Bill in such a way as to 

 prevent it. 



Similarly, "Big Ticket" scientific cooperation meets roadblocks 

 in foreign policy. It is justified as a diplomatic means of strengthening 

 the Western alliance and of sharing the heavy financial burden involved in 

 space or nudear research. But that first justification rests on the 

 assumption that our allies might weaken Western unity if we did not 

 cooperate, implying a policy of ^ite at best and blackmail at worst, 

 which I consider alarmist- The second justification— sharing of 

 costs— assumes that 5 percent (or so) in cost savings to the U.S. is not 



