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McDougalU Science Policy Task Force, page 7 



age of global integratiDn, as the Americans liked to believe, nor of the 

 triumph of Communism, as Khrushchev boasted, but rather an age of 

 heightened self-sufficiency and competition, even neo-mercantilism. For 

 deGaulle embraced the capitalist assumption that competition was the 

 engine of progess, but also the communist assumption that competition 

 was the solvent of community. A smaller country like France especially 

 could not afford chaotic competition within, but had to mobilize and 



unite at home in order to compete with rival states abroad. 



In the 1960s, European industry formed an international lobby 

 called EUROSPACE to promote the drive for "state-of-the-art" 

 technology. NASA offered scienti fic cooperation and perhaps a 

 sub-contracting role to the Eiaropeans, but EUROSPACE made explicit 

 that its goal was not to play little brother to the US: "The target for 

 European industry is dearly to acquire prime contractor status for all 

 space applications systems." Building on what they could derive from 

 cooperation with NASA, assimilate from American literature, or purchase 

 from American firms, the Europeans in turn practiced a kind of 

 "Euro-GauUism," borne of resentment of U.S. leadership and a desire to 

 pilay an independent role on the new frontiers of science. 



The White House and Congress both endorsed space cooperation 

 as a matter of prindLplfi and good will^ but U.S. policy in the early Space 

 Age was not naive. NASA's approach could be summed up as "cooperation 

 in science; competition in engineering." In other words, the U.S. would 

 place foreign experiments on U.S. satellites, or even launch foreign 

 satellites, but not transfer technology that could feed into foreign 



