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McDougalU Science Polijcy Task Force, page 10 



are when we read of high tech leaks, sales, and espionage, I don't believe 

 the American people would want a commercial police capahla cf shutting 

 off such leaks. What is more, secrets are hard to keep even with 

 restrictions (witness the rapid Soviet development of an atomic bomb), 

 and the value of secrets is dubious. (Edward Teller, I believe, has stated 

 that there is no secret worth keeping classified for more than one year.) 



Rather than be moved to imitate Soviet-style secrecy or 

 GauHist-style neo-mercantilism, the U.S. should recognize that its relative 

 decline is inevitable— even a measure of the success of our postwar 

 policies toward Europe and East Asia— and take steps to ensure that we 

 remain leaders only in those fields of science and technology that we 

 deem critical. And even in those fields, the best way to stay ahead in the 

 race is not to hud. obstacles at our rivals, but simply to run faster. And 

 if the Europeans and Japanese are in a position to challenge us, so much 

 the better: we aH pQay our best tennis against a tough opponent. 



Having said that, however, we need not approach scientific 

 cooperation with a gratituitous generosity. (This may or may not apply to 

 the Third World— perhaps we can discuss that in the question period). 

 Rather, we should ajproach "Big Ticket" cooperation with the knowledge 

 that our prospective partners are keenly measuring how such cooperation 

 will help them leverage us in the future, and we, too, ought to demand 

 real concessions for making our facilities availahle. 



As for which fields of science and technology are critical, I 

 understand how d iff i c ult it must be to choose. The late Senator Clinton 



