95 



Questdons For the Record— McDougalU page 2 



to spend large sums on it at alL Given the role played by modem warfare in 

 the growth of state-sponsored science, this conundrum is quite 

 understandable. Ever since the first flush of detente, we have been looking 

 for ways to cooperate with the Soviets which do not involve important 

 "give-aways." It cannot be done. If it's important, it involves potential 

 "give-aways"; if it's not important, why do it? In the last ten years the 

 problem of gratuitous transfer of science and technolDgy unfortunately 

 applies also bo U.S. relations with its allies. The French, Japanese, and 

 others view international cooperation quite self-consciousLy as a path toward 

 eventual competiveness. Joint European space and atomic programs have 

 been piagued from the start by such a double agenda, with each nation 

 seeking advantage vis-a-vis its partners, even as Europe as a whole seeks to 

 become competitive with the U.S. No responsible government would act 

 diEferently. 



If the competitive imperative were the only one, however, we 

 would not expect to see any scientific cooperation at all. Countervailing 

 trends also exist, derived from the immense cost of such scientific tools as 

 particle accelerators and ^)ace stations. As a result, institutionalized 

 cooperation has been expanding in the last two decades, at least among the 

 non-communist industrialized nations. 



3. Based on the historical record, how has the United States 

 benefitted pcJitically, financially, militarily, and scientifically, from 

 international cooperatiDn in science? What types of cooperation produced the 

 best results? 



Following on the previous answer, cooperation has been expanding 

 in recent decades for financial and diplomatic considerations. But given the 

 competitive impulse for each government, every incidence involves arduous 

 negotiations to balance national costs and benefits, with great potential for 

 ill will and misunderstanding. "Cooperation" per se, therefore, is not even an 

 automatic diplomatic plus, whatever effect it has on national standing in 

 science. We should not shy away from cooperation, but neither should we 

 expect too much from it. At present the U.S. is the only free world country 

 capable of engaging in "big science" by itself. For us, cooperation is a 

 luxiary. And yet as leader of the free world and leading advocate for free 

 enterprise and open societies, the U.S. has chosen not to use our advantage 

 in scale against other countries, and has even helped them to become 

 competitive in certain fields of commercial importance. Tinis is the glory and 

 the tragedy of the American position. 



I am not able to evaluate the scientific benefits cf cooperation, 

 but I am somewhat skeptical concerning non-scientific benefits. The U.S. has 

 always tended to aim its sights too high. The Atoms for Peace program 

 promised a global developmental boom based on cheap energy. Instead, it 

 only revealed the barriers and drawbacks to transferring high technology to 

 backward nations, as well as increasing potential for nuclear weapons 

 proliferatiDn. In the 1960s Kennedy promised world understanding and 

 integration through a global Comsat system. Instead, we learned that 

 governments in other developed nations resent our leadership, while those in 

 under-developed ones are more interested in dictatorial control of 



