great detail what has to be done from an engineering or technical 

 or scientific point of view to produce an approved program. 



The next conclusion that we came to was that international col- 

 laboration will require stable international commitments. This is 

 something that we as a group of Americans on this committee 

 found very interesting to listen to, but it was told to us politely, 

 bluntly, and on the side, so to speak, that America was not regard- 

 ed as a very reliable partner. 



Now, I realize that the narrow difference between agility on the 

 one hand and reliability and consistency on the other is sometimes 

 debatable. But there have been other areas of endeavor where we 

 apparently have unilaterally changed course without adequate con- 

 sultation and these scars persist. 



So I think that there is going to be quite some discussion as to 

 just how much of an international commitment, how firm a com- 

 mitment can be made. 



I might point out in this connection that in contrast to our 

 annual budgeting tradition, that the European Community, in the 

 case of the Joint European Torus, set up a 5-year plan. It is re- 

 viewed annually, but the major revision of the budget occurs at the 

 3-year point. So in this sense, there is more of a stability in what 

 the plan is and what the funds are to support it compared to what 

 we are accustomed to. This, I believe, is the type of difference that 

 exists that we would have to find a way to satisfy potential part- 

 ners or to live with ourselves. 



Then beyond that there are a host of other considerations that 

 have to be resolved, and I don't think we have found any that were 

 completely unworkable. But, for example, there is the matter of ev- 

 erything from the ownership of intellectual property, licensing pro- 

 visions, and so on. And these things differ to such a degree that it 

 is going to take a fair amount of effort by joint planning teams to 

 see what is the best solution. 



I think that one of the reasons we felt— or the principal reason 

 that we felt— that large-scale international collaboration was pref- 

 erable — and now I am speaking for the committee as accurately as 

 I can, is the fact that for a program that has potential results so 

 far in the future, it did appear that it was to the advantage of 

 these United States to be involved with an international program 

 which would have the best potential for, first of all, doing a decent 

 job but also being stable over the period of time that this research 

 was being carried on. 



So out of these conclusions, we have developed two recommenda- 

 tions. The first was— and I will read it— "The first priority should 

 be the establishment of a clear set of policies and objectives and a 

 considered program plan for future U.S. fusion activities." 



Now, that sounds very straightforward, but I must say that the 

 current Department of Energy plan is not sufficiently detailed to 

 be understood by potential European or Japanese collaborators, 

 and that a fleshed-out version is an absolute necessity before any 

 joint detailed planning could proceed profitably. 



I think there is still a concern abroad that we really have not 

 pinned down what it is we want to do. I might say that it was 

 during the course that we were overseas having some of these dis- 

 cussions that the projected core burning experiment disappeared 



