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port for a joint construction project in time to affect necessary U.S. 

 budget decisions. As a result, the project was terminated in 1984. 



The question is why, after early planning in the technical com- 

 munity and continued technical level support, no progress toward a 

 joint facility was forthcoming. The answer, I believe, rests on two 

 factors: the nature of the early planning and the nature of the po- 

 litical level support for collaboration. 



Throughout most of the seventies and the early eighties, the de- 

 velopment of long-term fusion technology, particularly in the mate- 

 rials area, was not of high priority in the European Community or 

 in Japan. In contrast, the United States put more emphasis on 

 fusion technology, which we felt was needed for the practical appli- 

 cations, and we were the clear leader in the development of fusion 

 technology throughout this period. 



In the European Community, scientists were interested in learn- 

 ing about the U.S. technology, but at the time of the FMIT propos- 

 al, their funds for the next 3 to 5 years were already committed. 

 They were committed to scientific projects of their own and to 

 building up a technology program of their own. 



The low priority that was then accorded to materials work did 

 not warrant the required shifting of funds. There was also no large 

 institutional advocate for FMIT within the European Community, 

 so that when our posture changed from a willingness to host visi- 

 tors on our facility to one of requesting participation in the con- 

 struction, there was just no institutional constituency to support 

 the change. 



As for the early efforts of planning, these were initiated by the 

 United States in 1975, but they had not borne fruit because of the 

 different technical priorities which then existed in the world's 

 fusion programs. In the European Community and Japan, the role 

 of materials technology, in particular, simply had not received the 

 high priority it had in the United States. 



Furthermore, there had been no prior political pressure for 

 common program planning that could have formed the framework 

 for supporting such new proposals. In the absence of this multina- 

 tional political framework, the internal political decision made by 

 the United States to limit the fusion budget was, by itself, insuffi- 

 cient grounds for altering the priorities of these other nations. 



Now, there have been positive results from this experience. We 

 have learned the importance of early coupling of joint program 

 planning with the necessary political commitment. We are empha- 

 sizing this in all areas where there may be a need for a major 

 international fusion facility. 



In particular, to ensure the prospects for success in a practical 

 undertaking, early joint planning must begin with the development 

 of common priorities and then proceed to technical planning. 



In regard to fusion materials, we are pursuing an initiative 

 within the lEA framework by means of a new Blue Ribbon Panel. 

 This Panel is aimed at developing a consensus on technical prior- 

 ities for an international fusion materials research and develop- 

 ment program. This international initiative can help us avoid the 

 mismatch of materials sciences with other development priorities 

 that led to the FMIT disappointment. 



