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The question is why, after early planning in the technical coraraunity and 



continued technical level support, no progress toward a joint facility was 



forthcoming. The answer, 1 believe, rests on two factors: the nature of 



the early planning and the political level support for collaboration. 



Throughout most of the seventies and early eighties, the development of 



long-term fusion technology, particularly materials, was not a high priority 



for the EC or Japan. In contrast, the U.S. put more emphasis on the fusion 



technology needed for practical applications and was the clear leader in 



developing fusion technology throughout this period. In the EC, scientists 



were interested in learning about U.S. technology, but at the time of the 



FMIT proposal their funds for the next three to five years were already 



committed to scientific projects and to building up a technology program of 



their own. The low priority then accorded to materials work did not warrant 



the required shift of funding. There were also no large institutional 



advocates for FMIT within the EC so that when our posture changed from a 



t 

 willingness to host visitors to a need for financial participation, there 



was no institutional constituency to support that change in the EC. 



The early efforts at joint planning initiated by the U.S. in 1975 had not 

 borne fruit because of the different technical priorities which then existed 

 in the world's fusion programs. In the EC and Japan, the role of materials 

 technology in their program simply had not received the high priority it had 

 in the U.S. 



