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one agency to another how much that statement is true, but over- 

 all, I think it is generally true. 



Difficult as it is for cooperation on projects of clear scientific 

 merit and interest, proposals with mixed scientific and political ob- 

 jectives have no natural home or funding resource. 



There are many different categories of cooperative programs that 

 need to be considered, for each has rather different issues associat- 

 ed with it. There are, for example, those programs of high scientific 

 quality that contribute to scientific objectives of an American do- 

 mestic agency; or there are those of primary value to developing 

 countries; or those with political overtones, or others. 



I discuss all of the categories in material I am submitting with 

 my statement for the record but will mention here only two: that 

 category of programs that would be of high scientific quality and 

 high interest to a Government agency if it were to be carried out, 

 whoever carried it out, and second, the category of programs with 

 mixed scientific and political objectives, such as, for example, those 

 with the Soviet Union. 



In principle, one would expect few problems with proposed pro- 

 grams of cooperation that are of high quality and would contribute 

 to the scientific objectives of an American Government agency. 

 Presumably, the programs could compete in routine fashion for 

 funds within agency budgets and objectives, with relatively clear 

 criteria of choice. 



In practice, there are significant problems that serve to create 

 major disincentives to develop such projects or to carry them 

 through to implementation. Dr. Clarke, who preceded me here, I 

 think, mentioned some of those along the way in his testimony. 

 These have to do with the dominant domestic perspective in the 

 U.S. agencies and corresponding lack of international interest, and 

 the detailed processes by which projects are proposed and funded. 



The overwhelming domestic orientation of the American R&D 

 enterprise is often a surprise, not only to scientists in other coun- 

 tries but also to Americans used to the view that science is basical- 

 ly an international, or at least a nonnational, enterprise. 



Though science is nonnational in its substance, nations do sup- 

 port science and technology for national purposes, and the institu- 

 tions of government providing support are necessarily oriented to 

 national goals. 



In the United States, the development of governmental institu- 

 tions has historical, cultural, geographic and security roots that 

 result in a policy process that weights domestic interests and con- 

 cerns to a very much greater extent than is the case in most other 

 industrial countries. 



The separation of powers between the Executive and the Con- 

 gress is a major factor in continuing this dominance of domestic in- 

 terests. Moreover, the very scale of science and technology in the 

 United States, coupled with the geographic position of the country, 

 has tended to make scientists and engineers as a whole less knowl- 

 edgeable about, and less interested in, what is happening outside 

 the country. 



The result is a policy and budget process geared so automatically 

 to domestic purposes for the use of funds that necessary adjust- 

 ments for international projects — for example, extra initial costs 



